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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Power
Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a top-down a--_lysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Power Reactants Storage and
Distribution (PRSD) System hardware.
The EPG/PRSD hardware is required for performing critical
functions of cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen storage and
distribution to the Fuel Cell powerplants (FCP) and Atmospheric
Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS). Specifically,
the EPG/PRSD hardware consists of the following:
o Hydrogen (H2) tanks
o Oxygen (02) tanks
o H2 Relief Valve/Filter Packages (HRVFP)
o 02 Relief Valve/Filter Packages (ORVFP)
o H2 Valve Modules (HVM)
o 02 Valve Modules (OVM)
o 02 and H2 lines, components, and fittings
The IOA analysis process utilized available EPG/PRSD hardware
drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect
for each failure mode.
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Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the seven major divisions of the EPG/PRSD. A summary of the
number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below
with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
CriticalityIl'lI2'  Number : 38 38 2/2 3/IR[31 3/2R4 3/351 TOTAL162
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality: [ 1/1Number : 38
2/1R 2/2
38 3/IR]6 3/2R
TOTAL
82
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CRIT. #FM #PCI CRIT. #FM #PCI
111 6 6 3/2R 0 0
211R 1 1 313 "13 O
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H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRIT. #FM #PCI CRIT. #FM #PCI
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211R 3 3 3/3 0 6
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 A_alysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 EPG/PRSD Ground Rules and Assumptions
The EPG/PRSD ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B.
3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The EPG/PRSD consists of hardware that is required for cryogenic
hydrogen and oxygen storage and distribution to the FCP and
ARPCS. Reference Figures 2 and 3. The EPG/PRSD consists of the
following divisions:
l • The Hydrogen (H2) tanks can number from 2 to 5 (each
tank having a l:l correspondence to an oxygen tank).
The H2 reactant is stored in the tank at an initial
temperature of -424 degrees E. Each tank consists of
an A and B heater, heater controller pressure sensor,
tank pressure sensor, fluid temperature sensor,
quantity sensor, heater assembly temperature sensor,
relief valve and port, and fill and vent Quick
Disconnects (QD) with caps. The reactant flow to the
fuel cells is controlled by operation of the heaters
which in turn are controlled by the heater controller.
Reference Figure 4.
o There is a H2 Relief Valve/Filter Package for each H2
tank. All HRVFP's have a filter, and the ones for
tanks 1 and 2 contain a manifold relief valve, while
those for tanks 3 and 4 contain a check valve. The
filters extract reactant impurities which could degrade
fuel cell performance• The manifold relief valves
relieve excess manifold pressure by allowing reactants
to flow into tanks 1 or 2. The check valves prevent
reactants from flowing back into the tank in the event
it is at a low pressure. Tanks 4 and 5 share a check
valve. Reference Figure 5.
© There are 2 H2 Valve Modules. Both HVMs contain a
check valve (one for tank l, one for tank 2), a
manifold shutoff valve and its position indicator, and
a manifold pressure sensor. HVM 1 contains a
horizontal drain QD and cap. HVM 1 also contains one
fuel cell reactant supply valve and its position
sensor, while HVM 2 contains two of each. HVM 2 also
contains a Ground Support Equipment (GSE) valve and GSE
Time Zero (T-O) fill QD. The manifold valves can be
used to isolate manifold 1 from 2. The GSE valve and
fill QD allow the fuel cells to run on ground reactants
before launch• Reference Figure 6.
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The Oxygen (02) tanks flown on a mission can number
from 2 to 5. The 02 reactant is stored in the tank at
an initial temperature of -300 degrees F. Each tank
contains heaters labeled AI, A2, B1 and B2, with one
heater assembly consisting of A1 and B1 and the other
containing A2 and B2. The tanks also consist of a
temperature sensor for each heater assembly, fluid
temperature sensor, quantity sensor, pressure sensor,
heater controller pressure sensor, relief valve and
port, fill QD and cap, and vent QD and cap. In a five
tank configuration, the B heater in tanks 4 and 5 are
not operational. Reference Figure 7.
There is an 02 Relief Valve/Filter Package for each 02
tank. All ORVFP's have a filter, plus the ones for
tanks 1 and 2 contain a manifold relief valve, while
those for tanks 3 and 4 contain a check valve.
Reference Figure 8.
There are 2 02 Valve Modules. Both OVM's contain a
check valve (one for tank l, one for tank 2), a
manifold shutoff valve and its position indicator, a
manifold pressure sensor, and an ECLSS system supply
valve and its position sensor• HVM 1 contains one fuel
cell reactant supply valve and its position sensor,
while HVM 2 contains two of each. HVM 1 contains a GSE
valve and GSE fill T-O QD. HVM 2 contains a horizontal
drain QD and cap. Reference Figure 9.
The 02 and H2 lines, components, and fittings made up
a separate category outside of the six major divisions.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The EPG/PRSD interfaces directly with the FCP and ARPCS.
Hydrogen and Oxygen are supplied to the FCP's while oxygen is
supplied to the ARPCS. The PRSD subsystem components are
installed in the mid-fuselage of the Orbiter beneath the payload
bay liner. The H2 and 02 tanks are arranged on both sides of the
mid-fuselage in a random type of order. Reference Figure i0.
The 02 and H2 relief and drain ports are located on both sides of
the Orbiter fuselage. Reference Figures Ii and 12.
3°3 Hierarchy
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the hierarchy of the EPG and PRSD
systems, respectively. The PRSD subsystems are depicted in
Figures 4 through 9.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the seven major sub-
divisions of the EPG/PRSD. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
4 ÷
TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
H2 Tanks
HRVFP
HVM
02 Tanks
ORVFP
OVM
02 & H2 Lines
TOTAL
i/1
6
3
8
6
3
I0
2
38
2/1R
1
3
12
1
3
16
2
38
2/2 3/1R
8
4
4
7
4
4
31
3/2R
2
2
313
13
i0
16
12
51
TOTAL
28
i0
36
30
l0
44
4
162
Of the 162 failure modes analyzed, 82 were determined to be PCIs.
A summary of the PCIs is presented in Table II. Appendix D
presents a cross reference between each PCI and a specific work
sheet in Appendix C.
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TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality :
H2 Tanks
HRVFP
HVM
02 Tanks
ORVFP
OVM
02 & H2 Lines
TOTAL
i/1
6
3
8
6
3
10
2
38
2/IR
1
3
12
1
3
16
2
38
2/2 3/IR
3
3
3/2R
i
TOTAL
l0
6
2O
i0
6
26
4
82
F r
4.1 Analysis Results - Hydrogen Tanks
Failures related to the H2 tanks and outer components were
analyzed. Critical failures were due to external leaks,
ruptures, loss of annulus vacuum, mechanical failures of valves,
and restricted flow out of relief ports. Noncritical failures
involved faulty tank pressure outputs and the inability of QDs to
mate/demate.
Components which make up the tanks were individually analyzed.
Critical failures involved faulty heater controller output and
malfunctioning heater elements. Noncritical failures involved
faulty heater temperature, tank quantity, and fluid temperature
outputs. Ten failures were identified to be PCIs.
4.2 Analysis Results - HRVFP
Critical failures of components involved clogged filters,
mechanical failures of valves, and external leakage. There were
no noncritical failures. Six failures were identified to be
PCIs.
Z-
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4.3 Analysis Results - HVM
Critical failures of components involved mechanical and
electrical failures of valves, and external leakage. Noncritical
failures involved the inability of QDs to mate/demate, faulty
output of pressure and valve position sensors, and electrical
failures of valves. Twenty failures were identified to be PCIs.
4.4 Analysis Results - Oxygen Tanks
Failures related to the 02 tanks and outer components were
analyzed. Critical failures were due to external leaks,
ruptures, loss of annulus vacuum, mechanical failures of valves,
and restricted flow out of the relief port. Noncritical failures
involved faulty tank pressure outputs and the inability of QDs to
mate/demate.
Components which make up the tanks were individually analyzed.
Critical failures involved faulty heater controller output and
malfunctioning heater elements. Noncritical failures involved
faulty heater temperature, tank quantity, and fluid temperature
outputs. Ten failures were identified to be PCIs.
4.5 Analysis Results - ORVFP
Critical failures of components involved clogged filters,
mechanical failures of valves, and external leakage. There were
no noncritical failures. Six failures were identified to be
PCIs.
4.6 Analysis Results - OVM
Critical failures of components involved mechanical and
electrical valve failures, and external leakage. Noncritical
failures involved the ability of QDs to mate/demate, faulty
output of pressure and valve position sensors, and electrical
failures of valves. Twenty-six failures were identified to be
PCIs.
4.7 Analysis Results - 02 and H2 Lines, Components and Fittings
Critical failures involved external leakage and restricted flow.
There were no noncritical failures. Four failures were
identified to be PCIs.
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Fitting, Rev. F, 7-10-75.
ME284-0281, Valve, Solenoid, Latching, Rev. J. ii-
1-74.
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VL70-008517, Electrical Power Subsystem - Intru-
Schematic, Rev. E, 3-7-74•
V070-454314, Panel - Hydrogen Control, LH Side,
Assy. of, Rev. A, 1-27-76.
VO70-454315, Panel-Oxygen Control, LH Side, Assy.
of, Rev. A, 2-20-76.
V070-454374, Panel - H2 Pressure Relief, PRSD,
Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, 4-14-75.
V070-454377, Panel - 02 Pressure Relief, PRSD
Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, 4-14-75.
V070-454388, Panel - H2 Pressure Relief,
Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev. B. 1-
14-82•
V070-454389, Panel - 02 Pressure Relief,
Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev. D, 8-
27-81.
VO70-454410, Panel - Oxygen Control, RH Side,
Assy. of, 4-3-75.
VO70-454411, Panel - Hydrogen Control, RH Side,
Assy. of, 4-3-75.
V070-454710, Panel - Oxygen Control, LH Side,
Assy. of, Rev. E, 3-12-82.
V070-454712, Braze & Insulation - H2 Control
valves & Components, LH Side, Assy. of, Rev. C,
4-17-79.
V070-454714, Panel - Oxygen Control, RH Side,
Assy. of, Rev. F, 10-8-82.
VO70-454716, Braze & Insulation - H2 Control
Valves & Components, RH Side, Assy. of, Rev. E, 4-
86.
VO70-454898, Electrical Power Substation, LH
Installation, Xo693 to Xo919, Rev. B, 12-85.
V070-454899, Electrical Power Subsystem
Instl-RH Side, Xo693 to Xo 919, Revo B, 12-10-82•
VS70-458678, PRSD 102 & Subs, Schematic, Rev. A,
11-7-79.
V525-454158, Panel - Tank Set 4, H2 Pressuure
Relief, Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev.
C, 7-9-84.
V525-454161, Panel - Tank Set 4, 02 Pressure
Relief, Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev.
E, 7-6-84.
V544-454137, Panel - Tank Set 3, 02 Pressure
Relief, Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev.
A, 7-29-80.
V544-454155, Panel - Tank Set 3, H2 Pressure
Relief, Electrical Power Subsystem, Assy. of, Rev.
B, 7-9-84•
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ACRONYMS
AOA
ARPCS
Assy
ATO
CIL
CRIT
CRYO
C&W
ECLSS
EGIL
EPG
EPS
F
FCP
FMEA
GFE
GSE
HR
HRVFP
H2
HVM
HW
IOA
JSC
LB
LH
MDAC
MECO
MPS
NASA
NSTS
NA
OMRSD
OMS
ORVFP
O2
OVM
PCI
PLS
PRCB
PRSD
psi
psig
QD
Rev
RH
D
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
I
m
m
m
a
m
I
m
m
m
Abort Once Around
Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem
Assembly
Abort To Orbit
Critical Items List
Criticality
Cryogenic
Caution and Warning System
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Electrical, General Instrumentation, and Lighting
Engineer
Electrical Power Generation
Electrical Power System
Functional
Fuel Cell Powerplant
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Government Furnished Equipment
Ground Support Equipment
Hour
Hydrogen Relief Valve/Filter Package
Hydrogen
Hydrogen Valve Module
Hardware
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Pound
Left Hand
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Main Engine Cutoff
Main Propulsion Subsystem
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Space Transportation System
Not Applicable
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and
Specification Document
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
Oxygen Relief Valve/Filter Package
Oxygen
Oxygen valve Module
Potential Critical Item
Primary Landing Site
Program Requirements Control Board
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge
Quick Disconnect
Revision
Right Hand
A-I
RI
RTLS
STS
TAL
T-O
Xo
w
m
m
I
w
n
Rockwell International
Return to Landing Site
Space Transportation System
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Time Zero
X Axis of Orbiter
A-2
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the fo--_lowing
_plifications and additi--_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
t-_nsition to OpS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
t-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to r_sult in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM[ - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(OPS)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transitio-n out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and _ at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and end_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications _d addition.
I .
.
,
.
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
B-4
i'
i
_A
i_
!,
r
•.
•
•
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail•
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis ofmission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project•
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
EPG/PRSD - Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
Component age life will not be considered in the analysis.
RATIONALE: Component age life analysis is beyond the
scope of this task.
Cryogenic system pressure to the fuel cell will be assumed
lost if unable to maintain minimum supply conditions of 100
PSI for H2 and/or 02 tanks.
RATIONALE: Minimum requirements definition. Flight
rule definition.
An 02 cry. tank will be assumed lost if both of its heaters
fail to function (i.e., neither heater will function with
the delta current sensors enabled)•
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition.
definition.
Flight rule
An -H2 cry, tank will be assumed lost if neither of its
heaters will function.
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition.
definition.
Flight rule
An impending loss of all cry. 02 or all cry. H2 tanks will
be cause to exercise the highest-priority abort mode the
loss/leak will allow.
RATIONALE: Flight rule definition•
Continue nominal ascent if 2/3/4 02 (H2) tanks fail when
flying 3/4/5•
Enter next PLS daily go/no-go if two 02 (H2) tanks fail
during lift-off and on-orbit.
RATIONALE: Flight rules go/no-go criteria•
Ascent abort decision will be needed for any EPG/PRSD/FCP
problems that will not support four hours on-orbit plus
entry time.
RATIONALE: Flight operations rules.
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A fuel cell will be considered failed if the following
conditions exist.
a. An abnormal or unexplained voltage versus current
performance loss of >0.5 volts for a single FC based on
predicted performance data.
b. Coolant pump or H2 pump/H20 separator is lost.
c. Fuel cell stack-coolant temperature >255 degrees
(242.5) degrees F or <175 degrees (182.5) degrees F.
d. Coolant pressure >75 (71.4) PSIA and increasing.
e. Fuel cell unable to discharge water to the ECLSS H20
storage tanks or overboard via the fuel cell H20
relief system.
f. Local KOH concentration >48 percent (45 percent) dry or
<24 percent (29 percent) wet as indicated by fuel cell
stack-coolant temperature, condenser exit temperature,
and current relationship.
g. Fuel cell reactant valve fails closed.
h. Cannot be connected to a main bus.
i. Fuel cell H20 pH high confirmed.
j. Fuel cell 02 reaction chambers cannot be purged.
k. Fuel cell end-cell heater failing on.
I. Fuel cell substack delta volts >150 millivolts and
increasing.
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition•
Loss of one fuel cell is considered cause for priority
flight and abort decision.
RATIONALE: Mission flight rule definition.
Loss of two fuel cells is considered cause for abort
mission.
RATIONALE: Contingency action summary. Flight Rule
definition.
Loss of three fuel cells is considered loss of life/vehicle
in all mission phases.
RATIONALE: Flight rule definition.
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18.
Loss of two fuel cells in the first stage of ascent is
considered loss of life/vehicle.
RATIONALE: SRB loads are too high for one fuel cell to
support, voltage may go <25v which will
shut down the GPCs.
Although the ECLSS product-water storage is a separate
system from EPG, it will be considered as a failable
redundant product-water relief line for purposes of the EPG
functional criticality scenarios.
RATIONALE: This assumption violates general ground
rule 3.1.1.6 but is essential for
evaluating failures associated with the
water relief line.
Filter failure will only be considered in the case of total
flow blockage. Cases of improper/insufficient filtering
will not be considered except where obvious.
RATIONALE: The effect of "poor' filter performance on
downstream components is beyond the scope
of our efforts.
The start/sustaining heater on the left-hand FCP (FCP #i) is
assumed to be disconnected. Thus, this FCP cannot be
maintained operational at no-load, and will be considered
shutdown if the load cannot be maintained at greater than 2
KW.
RATIONALE: Load needed to maintain operating
temperature. RH FCP uses sustaining heater
to maintain temperatures at no-load.
For all "failed open" failure modes for valves which are
normally open, redundancy screen B will be assumed failed.
RATIONALE: The failure is not detectable until the valve
is required to be closed.
Five 02 and H2 tanks are being used as the baseline
configuration under study.
RATIONALE: The configuration for all redundant components
is being considered for this analysis.
Inadvertant Fuel Cell shutdown during RTLS and TAL abort is
considered loss of crew/vehicle.
RATIONALE: Loss of FCP 1/Bus A is loss of OMS Engine
Purge Capability (required for TAL) and Aft
Compartment MPS Helium Purge Capability
(required for RTLS and TAL).
B-8
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DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NST___SS22206 r Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
an___dCIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
200 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
QD'S (5)
FAILURE MODE:
H2 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL QUICK DISCONNECT (4) & VENT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0210
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FATIGUE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH TANK HAS FILL AND VENT QD'S, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TANKS 4
AND 5 WHICH SHARE A FILL QD. ALL QD'S ARE ALSO CAPPED FOR
ADDITIONAL REDUNDANCY. FAILURE OF A QD ALONE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
BOTH CAP AND QD HAVE TO LEAK FOR A TANK LEAK TO OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
201 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
QD'S (5)
FAILURE MODE:
H2 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL QUICK DISCONNECT (4) & VENT
INABILITY TO MATE/DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0210
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MISSION COULD BE DELAYED IF THE TANKS CANNOT BE FILLED OR THE
QD CANNOT BE RELEASED. THE FILL QD ALSO FUNCTIONS AS A VERTICAL
DRAIN AT PAD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 202 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: H2 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL AND VENT QD CAPS (9)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPG !
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
s)
6)
8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1 R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B IF] C [P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0010-0260
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FATIGUE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH TANK HAS ITS OWN VENT QD CAP AND FILL QD CAP, EXCEPT TANKS 4
AND 5 WHICH SHARE A FILL QD CAP. THE QD'S THEMSELVES ARE A LEVEL
OF REDUNDANCY TO STOP LEAKS. BOTH CAP AND QD HAVE TO LEAK FOR A
TANK LEAK TO OCCUR. FAILURE OF THE CAP ALONE IS NOT
DETECTABLE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
203 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR (5)
FULL OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC449-0185-003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE PRESSURE SENSORS HAVE NO EFFECT ON OTHER COMPONENTS; THEY
ONLY DRIVE GAUGES. FULL OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE THE CREW TO TURN OFF
THE HEATERS. THE CREW WOULD CHECK RELIEF VALVE CRACK PRESSURE,
AND QUANTITY AND TEMPERATURE SENSORS TO SEE IF THE PRESSURE
SENSOR WAS ACCURATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-5
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
204 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR (5)
ZERO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC449-0185-003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE THE CREW TO TURN THE HEATERS ON. THE
CREW WOULD CHECK THE TEMPERATURE AND QUANTITY SENSORS TO SEE IF
THE PRESSURE READING WAS ACCURATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
205 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR (5)
OUT OF TOLERANCE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2 ) PRS D
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC449-0185-003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INACCURATE READING MAY CAUSE THE CREW TO MANUALLY OPERATE THE
HEATERS, TO KEEP THE PRESSURE READING WITHIN TOLERANCES. THE
CREW COULD USE THE TEMPERATURE AND QUANTITY SENSORS TO SEE IF THE
PRESSURE READING WAS ACCURATE. A SMALL ERROR WILL NOT CAUSE
ANY PROBLEMS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 206 ABORT:
ITEM: H2 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
FAILURE MODE: FULL OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC449-0185-033
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FULL OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE THE HEATERS NOT TO COME ON IN THE
AUTOMATIC MODE. THE PRESSURE WOULD HAVE TO DROP TO BELOW I00 PSI
BEFORE THE TANK IS CONSIDERED LOST, WHICH WOULD HAPPEN AFTER OMS
2. THE CREW COULD CHECK THE TANK PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE
SENSORS TO FIND THE PROBLEM. THE CREW ACTIVATES TANK 1 AND 2 A
HEATERS AFTER OMSI. THIS IS 3/IR BECAUSE THE TANK RELIEF VALVES
STUCK OPEN COULD CAUSE LOSS OF PRESSURE EARLY. THIS IS
DETECTABLE FROM THE TANK PRESSURE SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-8
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 207 ABORT:
ITEM: H2 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
FAILURE MODE: ZERO OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/I
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ IR RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC449-0185-033
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE THE HEATERS TO BE ON ALWAYS IN THE
AUTOMATIC MODE. THE RELIEF VALVE WOULD VENT H2 AND DEPLETE IT-
RELIEF VALVE FLOW RATE AT FULL FLOW PRESSURE IS 97 LB/HR WHILE
TANK QUANTITY IS 92.0 LB.
ALSO, THE TANK COULD RUPTURE STARTING 35 HOURS AFTER THE TANK
RESIDUAL LEVEL IS REACHEDAND THE HEATERS ARE STILL ON, THUS i/i.
THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM THE TANK PRESSURE SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 208 ABORT:
ITEM: H2 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
FAILURE MODE: OUT OF TOLERANCE
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC449-0185-033
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE DEPENDS ON THE DEGREE OF BEING OUT OF TOLERANCE-
WORST CASE IS THE UNION OF ZERO AND FULL OUTPUT. THIS COULD
CAUSE THE HEATERS TO OPERATE ERRATICALLY. THIS IS DETECTABLE
FROM THE TANK PRESSURE SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-lO
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
209 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/1
ITEM:
ELEMENT B (5)
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK HEATER ELEMENT A (5), H2 TANK HEATER
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5) H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: i/1 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: l/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH TANK HAS AN A AND B 105 WATT HEATER ELEMENT. THIS IS
CRITICALITY 3/IR BECAUSE THE RELIEF VALVE WOULD VENT THE
RESULTANT EXCESSIVE PRESSURE IN THE TANK AND DEPLETE THE H2. THE
RELIEF VALVE FLOW RATE AT FULL FLOW PRESSURE IS 97 LB/HR, WHILE
THE TANK QUANTITY IS 92.0 LB. THE TANK COULD RUPTURE STARTING 35
HOURS AFTER THE TANK RESIDUAL LEVEL IS REACHED, RESULTING IN
CRITICALITY i/1. THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM TEMPERATURE AND
PRESSURE SENSORS.
i •
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-II
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
210 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
ELEMENT B (5)
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK HEATER ELEMENT A (5), H2 TANK HEATER
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5) H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE PRESSURE FALLS BELOW i00 PSI, THE TANK IS CONSIDERED
LOST. THIS WILL ALLOW COMPLETION OF ALL ABORTS AND ASCENTS SINCE
THE EFFECT WOULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL AFTER OMS 2. THE CREW COULD
DETECT THE PROBLEM FROM TEMPERATURE, QUANTITY, AND PRESSURE
SENSORS. HOWEVER, THE CRITICALITY IS 3/IR IF A COMBINATION OF
TANK RELIEF VALVES AND MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVES FAIL OPEN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-12 !
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
211 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (5)-RV030,RV040,RV500,RV560
FAILED OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0440-0402
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EARLY DEPLETION OF H2 REACTANT WILL CAUSE FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN, AND
ALSO REDUCE TANK PRESSURE. IF SOME TANK'S CHECK VALVE FAILED
OPEN, THIS COULD LOSE ALL REACTANT, THUS RESULTING IN CRITICALITY
2/IR. THIS FAILURE IS DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME
FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-13
/INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
212 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (5)-RV030,RV040,RVS00,RV560
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 1R RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0440-0402
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE TANK PRESSURE GETS TOO HIGH, THE TANK COULD RUPTURE,
CAUSING LOSS OF REACTANT, FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN, AND LOSS OF THE
ORBITER. THE CRITICALITY IS 3/IR IF A TANK HEATER FAILS ON AND
ALL TANK RELIEF VALVES FAIL CLOSED.
<
<.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 1/1
213 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK RELIEF VALVE (5)-RV030,RV040,RV500,RV560
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: l/1 RTLS : l/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: l/1
ONORBIT: l/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: l/1 ATO: l/1
LANDING/SAFING: l/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0440-0402
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT LEAKING UNDER THE PAYLOAD BAY LINER COULD RESULT IN THE
EARLY DEPLETION OF H2 REACTANT, PLUS A POSSIBLE EXPLOSION. THE
LEAK IS DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY
CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/04/86 BTK C-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 214 ABORT:
ITEM: H2 RELIEF PORT 1 (i)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
s)
6)
s)
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
40V45VP035
CAUSES: BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
H2 RELIEF PORT 1 VENTS H2 FROM TANKS i, 2, AND 4 RELIEF VALVES.
IF RESTRICTED, IT WOULD NOT RELIEVE OVERPRESSURIZATIONAND A TANK
COULD RUPTURE. THERE IS A SEPARATE RELIEF PORT FOR TANKS 3 & 5.
THIS IS CRITICALITY 3/IR BECAUSE SAME TANK'S HEATERS
WOULD HAVE TO FAIL ON AND ITS CHECK VALVE FAIL CLOSED. THIS IS
DETECTABLE FROM TANK PRESSURE GAUGES OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 215 ABORT:
ITEM: H2 RELIEF PORT 2 (i)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
40V45VP045
CAUSES: BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
H2 RELIEF PORT 2 VENTS H2 FROM TANKS 3 & 5 RELIEF VALVES. IF
RESTRICTED, IT WOULD NOT RELIEVE OVERPRESSURIZATIONAND A TANK
COULD RUPTURE. THIS CAN DETECTED BY LOOKING AT TANK PRESSURE
GAUGES OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. THERE IS A SEPARATE RELIEF PORT
FOR TANKS l, 2, AND 4. THIS IS CRITICALITY 3/IR BECAUSE HEATERS
WOULD HAVE TO FAIL ON AND THE CHECK VALVE FAIL CLOSED FOR THE
SAME TANK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 216 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (5)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: _
i) EPG i
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE _!_
4) H2 TANKS !
5) _
6)
7) ;_
8) i_
9) _
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, TEMPERATURE, POROSITY,
OVERPRESSURIZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LEAK IN TANK OR THROUGH RELIEF VALVE WOULD CAUSE DEPLETION OF
H2 AND FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN. LEAKAGE UNDER THE PAYLOAD BAY MAY
CAUSE OTHER SYSTEMS TO FREEZE AND A POSSIBLE EXPLOSION. THIS IS
DETECTABLE THROUGH QUANTITY SENSORS AND CONSOLE CHARTS OVER A
PERIOD OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
217 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
RUPTURE
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/l
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: l/1 RTLS: l/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: l/1
ONORB IT: I/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: l/1 ATO: l/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: OVERPRESSURIZATION, TEMPERATURE, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE H2 IN THE TANK WOULD BE LOST, AND OTHER EXPLOSIONS MAY
RESULT. SHRAPNEL MAY PUNCTURE OTHER SYSTEMS AND THE EXTERIOR OF
THE ORBITER. THIS IS DETECTABLE THROUGH QUANTITY AND PRESSURE
SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 218 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
LOSS OF ANNULUS VACUUM
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPG i'
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS F
5) i
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: HOLE IN OUTER TANK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDUCTIVE AND CONVECTIVE HEAT TRANSFER COULD OCCUR WITHOUT A
VACUUM, CAUSING THE REACTANT TO HEAT UP AND BE DEPLETED QUICKLY.
THE CAUSE COULD BE FAILURE OF THE VACUUM IONIZATION PUMP AND VAC
ION PUMP PRESSURE SENSOR ON GROUND. THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM
TANK QUANTITY SENSORS AND CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS OVER A PERIOD
OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
219 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
V45T21(-5)07A
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
FULL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5) H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SENSOR CAN BE DETECTED BY CHECKING THE TANK FLUID
TEMPERATURE OR PRESSURE SENSORS. THE SENSOR IS ONLY CONNECTED TO
A GAUGE; IT DOES NOT AFFECT HEATER OPERATION. FULL OUTPUT
NORMALLY INDICATES THAT HEATERS ARE CONTINUOUSLY ENERGIZED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
220 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
V45T21(-5)07A
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
ZERO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5) H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT NORMALLY INDICATES THAT THE HEATERS ARE NOT
OPERATING. LOSS OF THE SENSOR HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON THE
MISSION OR CREW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
221 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
V45T21 (-5) 07A
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5) H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
"I)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INACCURATE READING MAY CAUSE THE CREW TO WANT TO MANUALLY
OPERATE HEATERS, TO KEEP THE TEMPERATURE READING WITHIN
TOLERANCES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-23
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
222 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILUREMODE:
H2 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5) V45T21(-4)01A
FULL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5) H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SENSOR HAS NO EFFECT ON HEATER OPERATION. FAILURE
OF SENSOR CAN BE DETECTED BY CHECKING HEATER ASSEMBLY TEMPERATURE
SENSOR OR TANK PRESSURE SENSOR. FULL OUTPUT WOULD NORMALLY
INDICATE THAT THE HEATERS WERE CONTINUALLY ENERGIZED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-24
17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 223 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: H2 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5) V45T21(-4)01A
FAILURE MODE: ZERO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5) H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD NORMALLY INDICATE THAT THE HEATERS WERE NOT
OPERATING. LOSS OF THE SENSOR HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON THE
CREW OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 224 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: H2 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5) V45T21(-4)01A
FAILURE MODE: OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG i!ii
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5) H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY _
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INACCURATE READING MAY CAUSE CREW TO WANT TO MANUALLY OPERATE
HEATERS, TO KEEP THE TEMPERATURE READING WITHIN TOLERANCES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 225 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45Q21(-5)05A
FULL OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5) H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SENSOR HAS NO EFFECT ON HEATER OPERATION. THE
SENSOR FAILURE CANNOT BE VERIFIED BY LOOKING AT OTHER
INSTRUMENTATION. THE CREW WOULD ONLY KNOW THAT TANK CANNOT
ALWAYS BE FULL. CREW MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIGURE OUT APPROXIMATE
QUANTITY BY TURNING HEATERS ON FOR A CERTAIN TIME AND MEASURE
CORRESPONDING FLUID TEMPERATURE OR PRESSURE RISE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 226 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45Q21(-5)05A
ZERO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG I
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS _
5) H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY _i
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063o0200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD HAVE NO AUTOMATIC EFFECT ON THE HEATERS.
OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE THE CREW TO WANT TO TURN HEATERS OFF AND
DEACTIVATE TANK.
ZERO
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 227 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45Q21(-5)05A
OUT OF TOLERANCE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN STORAGE
4) H2 TANKS
5) H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063-0200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INACCURATE READING MAY CAUSE CREW TO CHANGE THE TANK
MANAGEMENT SCHEME. THE CREW COULD OPERATE THE TANK MISTAKENLY
BELOW ITS REDLINE LIMIT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: i/I
MDAC ID: 228 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: H2 LINES, COMPONENTS, & FITTINGS
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: {
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION _
s)
6)
7) [
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
B [NA ] C [NA ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: VO70-454898
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, FATIGUE, OVERPRESSURE, BRITTLENESS DUE
TO TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL REACTANT COULD BE DEPLETED AND CAUSE FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN;
ALSO, A LEAK COULD CAUSE CRYO TO FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS UNDER THE
PAYLOAD BAY. THE LEAKING H2 COULD ALSO CAUSE AN EXPLOSION.
LEAKING IS DETECTABLE FROM TANK QUANTITY AND PRESSURE SENSORS
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
!/
L
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-30 I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 229
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM: H2 LINES, COMPONENTS, & FITTINGS
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
VO70-454898
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW COULD CAUSE NO REACTANT TO REACH THE FUEL CELLS,
AND THUS CAUSE THEM TO BE SHUTDOWN. OVERPRESSURE COULD BE VENTED
OUT THE TANK RELIEF VALVES AND MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVES. THIS IS
DETECTABLE FROM TANK PRESSURE SENSORS. THIS IS
CRITICALITY i/I FOR TAL BECAUSE A BLOCKAGE IN LINE TO FUEL CELL 1
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF OMS PURGE CAPABILITY. THIS IS CRITICALITY
i/I FOR RTLS BECAUSE A BLOCKAGE IN LINE TO FUEL CELL 1 WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT MPS HELIUM PURGE CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-31
[INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 230 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 FILTER (5) FL030,FL040,FL500,FL560
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGGED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) H2 DISTRIBUTION
H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: _3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC286-0054-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS, DAMAGED ELEMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH H2 AND 02 CRYO TANK HAS A FILTER FOR ITS REACTANT POSITIONED
AHEAD OF ITS CHECK VALVE. THE FILTER IS REPLACED EVERY 15
FLIGHTS. IF THE FILTER CLOGS, REACTANTS ARE UNABLE TO GET TO THE
FUEL CELLS, AND REACTANT IS DEPLETED OUT THE TANK RELIEF
VALVE. THIS FAILURE IS DETECTED USING THE TANK PRESSURE SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 231 ABORT:
ITEM: H2 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV031
FAILURE MODE: FAILED OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0440-0004
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RV031 BY ITSELF WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. LOSS OF RV041
ALSO, STILL WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF THE TANK 1 RELIEF VALVE
ALSO FAILED OPEN, IT COULD LOSE ALL REACTANT, THUS THE
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO DETECT THIS FAILURE
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME WITH THE TANK 1 QUANTITY SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
232 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV031
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IF RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IF ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IF
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0440-0004
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A PRESSURE BUILDUP AND POSSIBLE LINE RUPTURE COULD RESULT IF BOTH
RVO31 AND RV041 WERE CLOSED. ANY TANK WOULD HAVE TO HAVE ITS OWN
RELIEF VALVE FAILED CLOSED, PLUS ITS HEATERS FAILED ON (OR IN
MANUAL MODE) TO PRESSURIZE THE LINES ABOVE 302 PSIG.
THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM THE MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 233 ABORT:
ITEM: H2 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (I) RV031
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/i
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0440-0004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, FATIGUE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS CRITICALITY i/i BECAUSE A LEAK COULD CAUSE POSSIBLE
EXPLOSION OR FREEZING UNDER THE PAYLOAD BAY. A LEAK IS
DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-35
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 234 ABORT:
ITEM: H2 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV041
FAILURE MODE: FAILED OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0440-0004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RV041 BY ITSELF WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. LOSS OF RV031 ALSO
WOULD STILL HAVE NO EFFECT. IF TANK 2 RELIEF VALVE ALSO FAILED
OPEN, IT COULD LOSE ALL REACTANT, THUS THE CRITICALITY IS 2/IR.
IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO DETECT THIS FAILURE OVER A PERIOD
OF TIME WITH THE TANK 2 QUANTITY SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
235 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV041
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: . 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0440-0004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A PRESSURE BUILDUP AND POSSIBLE LINE RUPTURE COULD RESULT IF BOTH
RV031 AND RV041 FAIL CLOSED. THE CAUSE OF AN EXCESSIVE PRESSURE
BUILDUP WOULD BE TANK HEATERS FAILED ON. IT IS CRITICALITY 3/IR
IF A TANK'S HEATERS FAIL ON AND TANK RELIEF VALVE FAILS
CLOSED. THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM THE MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-37
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
236 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV041
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
I/i
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: i/I TAL:
ONORBIT" 1/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: l/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: l/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
I/1
i/1
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0440-0004
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, FATIGUE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS CRITICALITY I/I BECAUSE A LEAK COULD CAUSE POSSIBLE
EXPLOSION OR FREEZING UNDER PAYLOAD BAY. A LEAK IS DETECTABLE
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-38
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 237 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: H2 CHECK VALVE (2) CV031,CV041
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL LEAKAGE ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0428-0010
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CV031 CHECKS FLOW INTO TANK 3, CV041 CHECKS FLOW INTO TANKS 4 AND
5. HIGHER PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM OF THE CHECK VALVE THAN UPSTREAM
WOULD FORCE REACTANT INTO THE TANK LINE. LOW PRESSURE IN THE TANK
OR A LEAK WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR ALSO, IN ADDITION TO A CHECK
VALVE FAILURE. THE RESULT COULD BE LOWER CRYO FLOW TO THE FUEL
CELLS AND A POSSIBLE SHUTDOWN. THIS FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE A
TANK LEAK OR RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPENED IS NEEDED FOR THE FAILURE
TO BE DETECTABLE. THIS IS CRITICALITY 2/IR BECAUSE A COMBINED
FAILURE OF THE TANK RELIEF VALVE OPEN COULD LOSE ALL REACTANTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 238 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 CHECK VALVE (2) CV031,CV041
FAILS CLOSED (RESTRICTED FLOW ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0428-0010
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION_ CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT IS UNABLE TO LEAVE THE TANK. THIS DEPLETES H2 OUT OF
THE RELIEF VALVE AND COULD FORCE FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN. THIS IS
DETECTABLE FROM THE TANK PRESSURE SENSOR. FAILURE ALSO OF THE
TANK RELIEF VALVE CLOSED, HEATERS ON IN MANUAL MODE, OR FAILED
ON, COULD CAUSE AN EXPLOSION, THUS THE CRITICALITY IS 3/IR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-40
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[INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 239 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/I
ITEM: H2 CHECK VALVE (2) CV031,CV041
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0428-0010
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT DEPLETION INTO THE AREA UNDER THE PAYLOAD BAY COULD
CAUSE EXPLOSION, OR FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. THIS MAY RESULT IN LOW
OR NO CRYO FLOW INTO FUEL CELLS. THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM TANK
QUANTITY AND PRESSURE SENSORS AND MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSORS
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
240 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 CHECK VALVE (i) CV030
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL LEAKAGE ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0428-0010
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CV030 CHECKS FLOW INTO TANK i. HIGHER PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM OF
CHECK VALVE THAN UPSTREAM WOULD FORCE REACTANT INTO TANK LINE.
LOW PRESSURE IN TANK OR A LEAK WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR IN ADDITION TO
THE CHECK VALVE FAILURE. THE RESULT COULD BE LOWER CRYO FLOW
TO FUEL CELLS AND POSSIBLE SHUTDOWN. THIS FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE
NEED A TANK LEAK OR RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN TO DETECT. THIS IS
CRITICALITY 2/IR BECAUSE COMBINED FAILURE OF TANK RELIEF VALVE
OPEN COULD LOSE THE VEHICLE DUE TO REACTANT LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
241 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 CHECK VALVE (1) CV030
FAILS CLOSED (RESTRICTED FLOW ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) H2 VALVE MODULE 1
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0428-0010
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT IS UNABLE TO LEAVE TANK. THIS DEPLETES H2 OUT THE
RELIEF VALVE AND COULD CAUSE FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN. THIS IS
DETECTABLE FROM THE TANK PRESSURE SENSOR. FAILURE ALSO OF RELIEF
VALVE COULD CAUSE TANK EXPLOSION, IF HEATER IS ON IN MANUAL MODE
OR FAILED ON. THIS IS CRITICALITY 2/IR SINCE IF CV030 AND LV031
FAILED CLOSED DURING TAL AND RTLS COULD LOSE OMS PURGE
CAPABILITY, AND MPS HELIUM PURGE CAPABILITY RESPECTIVELY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/09/86 C-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
242 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 CHECK VALVE (i) CV030
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284=0428-0010
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT DEPLETION INTO THE AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE
EXPLOSION OR FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. THIS MAY RESULT IN LOW OR NO
CRYO FLOW INTO FUEL CELLS. THIS FAILURE IS DETECTABLE FROM TANK
QUANTITY SENSORS AND CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS OVER A PERIOD
OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-44
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
243 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 CHECK VALVE (i) CV040
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL LEAKAGE ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/1R
ATO: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0428-0010
B [ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CV040 CHECKS FLOW INTO H2 TANK 2. HIGHER PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM OF
CHECK VALVE THAN UPSTREAM WOULD FORCE REACTANT INTO TANK. LOW
PRESSURE IN TANK OR LEAK WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR IN ADDITION TO CHECK
VALVE FAILURE. THE RESULT COULD BE LOWER CRYO FLOW TO FUEL
CELLS AND POSSIBLE SHUTDOWN. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE NEED A TANK
LEAK OR RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN TO DETECT. 2/IR BECAUSE
COMBINED FAILURE OF TANK RELIEF VALVE OPEN COULD LOSE VEHICLE DUE
TO REACTANT LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
244 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 CHECK VALVE (I) CV040
FAILS CLOSED (RESTRICTED FLOW ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRS D
3) HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) H2 VALVE MODULE 2
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0428-0010
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT IS UNABLE TO LEAVE TANK. THIS DEPLETES H2 OUT THE
RELIEF VALVE AND COULD CAUSE FUEL CELL 2 SHUTDOWN IF LV041 WAS
CLOSED. THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM TANK PRESSURE SENSOR.
FAILURE ALSO OF RELIEF VALVE COULD CAUSE TANK EXPLOSION, IF
HEATER IS ON IN MANUAL MODE OR FAILED ON.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-46
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 245 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
ITEM: H2 CHECK VALVE (1) CV040
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0428-0010
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT DEPLETION INTO THE AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE
EXPLOSION OR FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. THIS MAY RESULT IN LOW OR NO
CRYO FLOW INTO FUEL CELLS. THIS FAILURE IS DETECTABLE FROM TANK
QUANTITY SENSORS AND CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS OVER A PERIOD
OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 246 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: H2 HORIZONTAL DRAIN QD (i) TYPE II, CLASS 8
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0280
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FATIGUE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HORIZONTAL DRAIN IS USED AFTER LANDING TO DRAIN REMAINING
REACTANT FROM PRSD. IF QD AND CAP BOTH LEAK, LOSS OF ALL
REACTANT COULD OCCUR, POSSIBLY CAUSING FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN. CAP
AND FILL QD'S ARE REDUNDANT ITEMS FOR THIS QD.
CANNOT DETECT LOSS OF QD ITSELF.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
247 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 HORIZONTAL DRAIN QD (1) TYPE II, CLASS 8
INABILITY TO MATE/DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0010-0280
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRAIN QD IS NOT USED AT LAUNCH PAD. NO EFFECT AFTER LANDING
BECAUSE MISSION HAS ALREADY ENDED AND CAN DRAIN H2 THROUGH FILL
QD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 248 ABORT:
ITEM: H2 HORIZONTAL DRAIN CAP (i)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0260
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FATIGUE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CAP IS A LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY OVER THE QD. REACTANT CANNOT
LEAK OUT UNLESS THE QD ALSO LEAKS. IF BOTH THE CAP AND QD LEAK,
COULD LOSE ALL H2. CANNOT DETECT LOSS OF CAP ALONE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-50
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
249 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
FULL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
ME 449-0177-2501
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MANIFOLD 1 SENSOR MEASURES PRESSURE BETWEEN TANK 1 CHECK VALVE,
FUEL CELL 1 SUPPLY VALVE, MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE, AND MANIFOLD 1
CROSSOVER VALVE. MANIFOLD 2 SENSOR MEASURES PRESSURE BETWEEN
TANK 2 CHECK VALVE, FUEL CELL 2 SUPPLY VALVE, H2 GSE
SUPPLY VALVE, MANIFOLD 2 CROSSOVER VALVE AND MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF
VALVE. THESE SENSORS HAVE NO EFFECT ON OTHER COMPONENTS.
MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE WOULD DISSIPATE EXCESS PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-51
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
250 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
ZERO OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME 449-0177-2501
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE THE CREW TO CHECK FUEL CELL H2 FLOW
METERS AND TANK PRESSURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-52
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 251 ABORT:
ITEM: H2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
FAILURE MODE: OUT OF TOLERANCE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME 449-0177-2501
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INACCURATE READING MAY CAUSE THE CREW TO CHECK FUEL CELL H2
FLOWMETERS AND TANK PRESSURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 252 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: H2 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (1) LV031
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4210
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRIC SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LV031 IS USED TO ISOLATE H2 FLOW IN TANK 1 AND VALVE MODULE 1
(FUEL CELL l) FROM FUEL CELL 3 AND VALVE MODULE 2 (FUEL CELL 2)
AND THE OTHER TANKS. IF THERE IS A LOW PRESSURE PROBLEM IN VALVE
MODULE l, LV041 WOULD NEED TO BE CLOSED TO PREVENT LOSS OF
ALL REACTANT. TANK 1 RELIEF VALVE AND MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE
WOULD HAVE TO FAIL OPEN TO LOSE ALL REACTANT. CLOSING LV041 WOULD
STILL SHUTDOWN FUEL CELLS 1 AND 3.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-54
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/2R
253 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (I) LV031
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) H2 VALVE MODULE 1
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4210
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRIC SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF BOTH CROSSOVER VALVES FAIL SHUT, TANKS 1 AND 2 WOULD DEPLETE
FASTER SINCE EACH WOULD HAVE TO FEED A FUEL CELL ALONE. ANY
FAILURES THAT PREVENT THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE CONTENTS OF TANKS 1
AND 2 COULD SHUTDOWN 2 FUEL CELLS. 2/1R FOR TAL BECAUSE
FAILURE OF TANK 1 OR ITS CHECK VALVE COULD CAUSE FUEL CELL 1
SHUTDOWN AND OMS PURGE LOSS. ALSO, THIS IS CRITICALITY 2/IR FOR
RTLS BECAUSE HELIUM PURGE CAPABILITY WOULD BE LOST. DETECTABLE
FROM VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. 3/2R IF TANK 1 HAS ITS CHECK
VALVE OR FILTER CLOSED , OR TANK RELIEF VALVE OPEN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: i/1
254 ABORT: l/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV031
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4210
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAK INTO AREA UNDER THE PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE
EXPLOSION OR POSSIBLE FREEZING OF OTHER SYSTEMS. IF ONLY LV031
LEAKS, CAN USE LV041 TO ISOLATE LEAK, BUT MAY LOSE FUEL CELLS 1
AND 3. IF BOTH MANIFOLD CROSSOVER VALVES LEAK, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
ALL REACTANTS. A LEAK IS DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM
CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-56
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
255 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LV033
FAILURE MODE:
H2 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i)
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF LV033 FAILS OPEN, CAN USE LV031 AND IF NEEDED, LV041 TO
ISOLATE FUEL CELL i. THIS IS CRITICALITY 2/IR BECAUSE IF FUEL
CELL IS SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF ONE OF ITS COMPONENTS, THEN THE
REACTANT FLOW HAS TO BE STOPPED OR AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR.
IF CREW CANNOT CLOSE VALVE, MISSION ABORT DECISION WOULD RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
256 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
LV033
FAILURE MODE:
H2 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (I)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: _ MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LV033 IS USED TO CONTROL H2 FLOW INTO FUEL CELL I. 2/IR FOR
ABORT/ASCENT BECAUSE IF 2 FUEL CELL REACTANT VALVES FAIL, THEN
ORBITER IS LOST. EARLIEST ORBITER CAN OPERATE ON ONLY 1 FUEL
CELL IS AFTER MECO. CAN DETECT USING FUEL CELL FLOW METER.
I/i FOR TAL BECAUSE OMS PURGE CAPABILITY WILL BE LOST, AND i/i
FOR RTLS BECAUSE HELIUM PURGE CAPABILITY WILL BE LOST. FAILURE
ONORBIT CAUSES PRIORITY FLIGHT DECISION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-58
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: I/i
257 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
LV033
FAILURE MODE:
H2 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) H2 VALVE MODULE 1
S)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4200
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAK INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION
AND FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. LEAK MAY PREVENT FUEL CELL FROM
RECEIVING ADEQUATE REACTANT.
LEAK IS DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY
CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-59
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
258 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LV043
FAILURE MODE:
H2 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i)
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4200
B[ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, JAMMING,
CONTAMINATION, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF LV043 FAILS OPEN, CREW CAN USE LV041 AND IF NEEDED, LV031 TO
ISOLATE FUEL CELL 2. THIS IS CRITICALITY 2/IR BECAUSE IF FUEL
CELL IS SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF ONE OF ITS COMPONENTS, THEN THE
REACTANT FLOW HAS TO BE STOPPED OR AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR.
IF CANNOT CLOSE VALVE, MISSION ABORT DECISION WOULD RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-60
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 259
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/1R
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LV043
FAILURE MODE:
H2 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LV043 IS USED TO CONTROL H2 FLOW INTO FUEL CELL 2. 2/IR FOR
ABORT/ASCENT BECAUSE IF 2 FUEL CELL REACTANT VALVES FAIL, THEN
ORBITER IS LOST. THE EARLIEST THE ORBITER CAN OPERATE ON ONLY 1
FUEL CELL IS AFTER MECO. DETECTABLE USING FUEL CELL FLOWMETER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-61
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 1/1
260 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
LV043
FAILURE MODE:
H2 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
i/I
I/i
I/I
I/i
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4200
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAK INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION
AND FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. LEAK MAY PREVENT FUEL CELL FROM
RECEIVING ADEQUATE REACTANT. LEAK IS DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD OF
TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-62
!,
L
L
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
261 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LV044
FAILURE MODE:
H2 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (I)
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, JAMMING,
CONTAMINATION, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LV044 IS USED TO CONTROL H2 FLOW INTO FUEL CELL 3. IF LV044
FAILS, CREWWOULD HAVE TO USE BOTH LV041 AND LV031 TO ISOLATE
FUEL CELL 3. THIS IS CRITICALITY 2/IR BECAUSE IF FUEL CELL IS
SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF ONE OF ITS COMPONENTS, THEN THE REACTANT
FLOW HAS TO BE STOPPED OR AN EXPLOSION COULD OCCUR. IF CREW
CANNOT CLOSE VALVE, MISSION ABORT DECISION WOULD RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
262 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LV044
FAILURE MODE:
H2 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (I)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
s)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: ° 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4200
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS CRITICALITY 2/IR FOR ASCENT/ABORT BECAUSE IF 2 REACTANT
VALVES FAIL CLOSED, THE ORBITER IS LOST. THE EARLIEST THE
ORBITER CAN OPERATE ON ONLY 1 FUEL CELL IS AFTER MECO. THE
FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED FROM FUEL CELL FLOWMETER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 263
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: I/1
ABORT: I/1
ITEM:
LV044
FAILURE MODE:
H2 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4200
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAK INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION
AND FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. LEAK MAY PREVENT FUEL CELL FROM
RECEIVING ADEQUATE REACTANT, A LEAK IS DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD
OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-65
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 264 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: H2 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV041
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: i
1) EPG I
2) PRS D
3) HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2 I_4)
F
6)
7)
8)
9) L
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4210
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LV041 IS USED TO ISOLATE H2 FLOW IN TANK 2 AND VALVE MODULE 2
(FUEL CELL 2) FROM FUEL CELL 3 AND VALVE MODULE 1 (FUEL CELL i)
AND THE OTHER TANKS. IF THERE IS LOW PRESSURE IN VALVE MODULE 2,
CREW CAN USE LV031 TO STOP LOSS OF ALL REACTANT, BUT THIS MAY
CAUSE SHUTDOWN OF FUEL CELLS 3 AND 2. ASCENT AND ABORT REQUIRE
AT LEAST 2 FUEL CELLS UNTIL MECO. TANK 2 RELIEF VALVE AND
MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE WOULD HAVE TO FAIL OPEN TO LOSE ALL
REACTANT. LOSS PRELAUNCH WOULD CAUSE MISSION DELAY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C=66
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/2R
265
ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (1) LV041
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4210
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
3/2R IF TANK 2 RELIEF VALVE FAILS OPEN OR CHECK VALVE FAILS
CLOSED. TANK 2 WOULD DEPLETE FASTER SINCE IT ALONE COULD FEED
FUEL CELL 2. FAILURE IS DETECTABLE FROM VALVE POSITION
INDICATOR. IF BOTH CROSSOVER VALVES FAIL SHUT, TANK 1 WOULD ALSO
DEPLETE FASTER SINCE IT ALONE WOULD BE FEEDING FUEL CELL i.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-67
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 1/1
266 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (1) LV041
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
I/I
i/i
1/l
i/i
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4210
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAK INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION
AND FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. IF ONLY LV041 LEAKS, CAN USE LV031 TO
STOP LEAK, BUT COULD LOSE FUEL CELLS 2 AND 3. IF BOTH MANIFOLD
SHUTOFF VALVES LEAK, ALL FUEL CELLS MAY BE SHUTDOWN.
THIS LEAK IS DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE
CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-68
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
267 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV045
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4220
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LV045 CONTROLS GROUND OPERATION FLOW OF FUEL CELL REACTANT. THIS
IS CRITICALITY 3/3 DURING PRELAUNCH BECAUSE VALVE IS OPEN UNTIL
T-0. CRITICALITY 2/IR OTHER PHASES BECAUSE REACTANT WOULD ONLY
BE CONTAINED BY H2 FILL T-0. LEAK COULD BE ISOLATED BY
CLOSING LV041. FUEL CELL 2 WOULD PROBABLY BE SHUT DOWN. LEAK
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL REACTANT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 268 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: H2 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV045
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) H2 VALVE MODULE 2
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4220
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE IS NORMALLY CLOSED EXCEPT FOR BEFORE T-0. A FAILURE
PRELAUNCH WOULD CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. THERE IS NO EFFECT AT OTHER
TIMES. VALVE FAILING CLOSED AT LAUNCH SITE MAY CAUSE BACK
PRESSURE ON GSE SUPPLY LINE TO ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-70
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
269 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (1) LV045
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) H2 VALVE MODULE 2
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORB I T: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4220
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, FATIGUE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAK INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION
AND FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. THE FAILURE IS DETECTED OVER A PERIOD
OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-71
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 270 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: H2 FILL GSE SUPPLY T-0 QUICK DISCONNECT (i) PD035
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2)
s)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC276-0012-0210
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FATIGUE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE H2 GSE SUPPLY T-0 QD HAS NO CAP AND ITS ONLY BACKUP IS THE
GSE SUPPLY VALVE. AN EXTERNAL LEAK COULD ONLY OCCUR IF THE VALVE
ALSO LEAKED, BUT IF BOTH LEAKED, COULD LOSE ALL REACTANT. A LEAK
COULD BE ISOLATED BY USING LV041 BUT PROBABLY FUEL CELL 2
WOULD BE SHUT DOWN.
i
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-72
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
271 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H2 FILL GSE SUPPLY T-0 QUICK DISCONNECT (1) PD035
INABILITY TO MATE/DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPG
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
S)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC276-0012-0210
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF QD CANNOT MATE OR DEMATE AT LAUNCH PAD, THE MISSION WILL BE
DELAYED. NO EFFECT ANY OTHER TIMES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-73
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
272 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 CHECK VALVE (I) CV010
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL LEAKAGE ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0428-0010
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CV010 CHECKS 02 FLOW INTO TANK I. HIGHER PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM OF
CHECK VALVE THAN UPSTREAM WOULD FORCE REACTANT INTO TANK LINE.
LOWER PRESSURE IN TANK OR LEAK WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR IN ADDITION TO
CHECK VALVE FAILURE. RESULT COULD BE LOWER CYRO FLOW TO
FUEL CELLS AND POSSIBLE SHUTDOWN. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE NEED A
TANK LEAK OR RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN TO NOTICE. THIS IS
CRITICALITY 2/1R BECAUSE COMBINED FAILURE OF TANK RELIEF VALVE
OPEN COULD LOSE VEHICLE DUE TO REACTANT LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-74
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 273 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
211R
ITEM: 02 CHECK VALVE (1) CV010
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (RESTRICTED FLOW ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
5)
6)
V)
S)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0428-0010
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT IS UNABLE TO LEAVE TANK. THIS DEPLETES H2 OUT THE
RELIEF VALVE AND COULD CAUSE FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN. THIS IS
DETECTABLE FROM THE TANK PRESSURE SENSOR. FAILURE OF RELIEF
VALVE CLOSED ALSO COULD CAUSE TANK EXPLOSION, IF HEATERS ON IN
MANUAL MODE OR FAILED ON. 2/1R BECAUSE IF CV010 AND LV011 FAIL
CLOSED, COULD LOSE OMS PURGE CAPABILITY FOR TAL, AND HELIUM PURGE
CAPABILITY FOR RTLS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-75
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
274 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 CHECK VALVE (1) CV010
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
s)
6)
v)
s)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: l/1 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: l/1 TAL:
ONORBI T: l/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: l/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: l/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/l
1/I
1/l
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0428-0010
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT LEAKAGE INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE
EXPLOSION OR FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. LEAK MAY RESULT IN LOW OR NO
CRYO FLOW INTO FUEL CELLS. THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM TANK QUANTITY
AND PRESSURE SENSORS AND MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSORS OVER A PERIOD
OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C=76
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
275 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV015
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL LEAKAGE ALSO)
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LV015 CONTROLS GROUND OPERATION FLOW OF FUEL CELL REACTANT. THIS
IS 3/3 DURING PRELAUNCH BECAUSE VALVE IS OPEN UNTIL T-0. IT IS
2/IR OTHER PHASES BECAUSE FAILURE OF 02 GSE T-0 QD WOULD CAUSE 02
LEAK AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF ALL REACTANT. LEAK COULD BE
ISOLATED BY CLOSING LV011, BUT FUEL CELL 1 AND SUPPLY TO ECLSS
SYSTEM 1 COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-77
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
276 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV015
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M, HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE IS NORMALLY CLOSED, EXCEPT FOR BEFORE T-0. FAILURE
PRELAUNCH WOULD CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY, AND POSSIBLE BACKPRESSURE IN
GSE SUPPLY LINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-78
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 277 ABORT:
ITEM: 02 SOLENOID GSE SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV015
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/1
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, FATIGUE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAK INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION
AND FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. FAILURE MIGHT BE DETECTED BY MANIFOLD
PRESSURE SENSOR, ALSO OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY
CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-79
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
278 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 1 SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV012
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL LEAKAGE ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2 ) PRS D
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
5)
6)
?)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/!R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4101
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. LV012 AND LV022 SUPPLY BREATHABLE OXYGEN
TO THE CREW. FAILURE COULD PREVENT CREW FROM ISOLATING LOW
PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM, AND STOPPING POSSIBLE EXPLOSION OR FREEZING
OF OTHER SYSTEMS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-80
t_
i •
/
k
i•
li!,
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
279 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 1 SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV012
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4101
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF BOTH LV012 AND LV022 ARE FAILED CLOSED, THE CREW WILL NOT BE
ABLE TO BREATHE FOR LONG. FAILURE IS DETECTABLE BY FLOW METERS
AND PRESSURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-81
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 280 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: 02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 1 SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV012
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: !
i) EPG !ii
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1 !
5)
6)
7) F
8)
L
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4101
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, FATIGUEs CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAK INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION
AND FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. FAILURE IS DETECTABLE OVER PERIOD OF
TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-82
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
281 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 2 SUPPLY VALVE (1) LV022
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL LEAKAGE ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4101
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN. LV022 AND LV012 SUPPLY BREATHABLE OXYGEN
TO THE CREW. FAILURE COULD PREVENT CREW FROM ISOLATING LOW
PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM AND STOPPING POSSIBLE EXPLOSION OR FREEZING
OF OTHER SYSTEMS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-83
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 282 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: 02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 2 SUPPLY VALVE (I) LV022
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4101
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF BOTH LV012 AND LV022 ARE FAILED CLOSED, THE CREW WILL NOT BE
ABLE TO BREATHE FOR LONG. FAILURE IS DETECTABLE BY FLOW METERS
AND PRESSURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C=84
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: i/i
283 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 2 SUPPLY VALVE (i) LV022
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4101
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, FATIGUE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAK INTO AREA UNDER THE PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE
EXPLOSION AND FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. A LEAK IS DETECTABLE OVER A
PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-85
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
284 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 FILL GSE SUPPLY T-0 QUICK DISCONNECT (I) PD015
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
s)
6)
v)
s)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC276-0012-0110
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FATIGUE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE 02 GSE SUPPLY T-0 QD HAS NO CAP AND ITS ONLY BACKUP IS THE 02
GSE SUPPLY VALVE TO PREVENT LEAKS. A LEAK COULD BE ISOLATED BY
LV015, LV011, AND LV021 IN ORDER. A LEAK IS DETECTABLE OVER A
PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-86
E
i¸
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
285 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 FILL GSE SUPPLY T-0 QUICK DISCONNECT (1) PD015
INABILITY TO MATE/DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC276-0012-0110
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE QD CANNOT MATE ON THE PAD, THE FUEL CELLS CANNOT USE
GROUND REACTANT. IF QD CANNOT DEMATE, THE MISSION WILL BE
DELAYED. NO EFFECT ANY OTHER TIMES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 286 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
FULL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG i
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION _4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
5) _
6)
7) F
8) i!
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
ME 449-0177-2503
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILUREs CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MANIFOLD 1 SENSOR MEASURES PRESSURE BETWEEN TANK 1 CHECK VALVE,
ECLSS SYSTEM 1 SUPPLY VALVE, FUEL CELL 1 SUPPLY VALVE, MANIFOLD 1
RELIEF VALVE, 02 GSE SUPPLY VALVE, AND THE MANIFOLD 1 CROSSOVER
VALVE. MANIFOLD 2 SENSOR MEASURES PRESSURE BETWEEN TANK 2
CHECK VALVE, MANIFOLD 2 CROSSOVER VALVE, FUEL CELL 2 SUPPLY
VALVE, ECLSS SYSTEM 2 SUPPLY VALVE, AND MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE.
THESE SENSORS HAVE NO EFFECT ON OTHER COMPONENTS. MANIFOLD
RELIEF VALVES WOULD DISSIPATE EXCESS PRESSURE.
CREW WOULD MAKE SURE ALL VALVES ARE OPEN TO FUEL CELLS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-88
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
287 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
ZERO OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME449-0177-2503
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE THE CREW TO CHECK FUEL CELL FLOW METERS
AND TANK PRESSURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-89
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 288 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR (2)
FAILURE MODE: OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: !_
i) EPG !i
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION _i
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1 I_
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME449-0177-2503
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INACCURATE READING MAY CAUSE THE CREW TO CHECK FUEL CELL
FLOWMETER AND TANK PRESSURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-90
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
289 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LV013
FAILURE MODE:
02 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (1)
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4102
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LV013 IS USED TO CONTROL 02 FLOW INTO FUEL CELL 1. IF FUEL CELL
1 IS SHUTDOWN, VALVE WOULD NEED TO BE CLOSED OR COULD LOSE
VEHICLE. COULD USE LV011 AND LV021 IF NEEDED TO ISOLATE FUEL
CELL, BUT COULD NOT STOP REACTANT FLOW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-91
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
290 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
LV013
FAILURE MODE:
02 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (I)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
5)
6)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : l/1
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: l/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4102
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ASCENT AND ATO/AOA ABORTS BECAUSE IF
2 FUEL CELL REACTANT VALVES FAIL, THEN ORBITER IS LOST. THE
EARLIEST AN ORBITER CAN OPERATE ON ONLY 1 FUEL CELL IS AFTER
MECO. CAN DETECT FAILURE BY USING FUEL CELL FLOWMETER. i/i FOR
TAL ABORT BECAUSE FUEL SHUTDOWN LOSES OMS PURGE CAPABILITY. i/i
FOR RTLS BECAUSE HELIUM PURGE CAPABILITY WOULD BE LOST. FAILURE
ONORBIT CAUSES PRIORITY FLIGHT DECISION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-92
.
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: i/1
291 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
LV013
FAILURE MODE:
02 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
5)
6)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4102
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
02 LEAKING INTO AREA UNDER THE PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION
AND FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. A LEAK MAY PREVENT THE FUEL CELL FROM
RECEIVING ADEQUATE REACTANT. THE FAILURE IS DETECTABLE OVER A
PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-93
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
292 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV011
FAILS OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG _
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1 I_
5)
6)
91
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4110
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LV011 IS USED TO ISOLATE 02 FLOW FROM TANK 1 AND VALVE MODULE 1
(FUEL CELL 1 AND ECLSS SYSTEM i) FROM THE OTHER FUEL CELLS AND
TANKS. IF THERE IS A LOW PRESSURE PROBLEM IN VALVE MODULE i,
LV021 WOULD NEED TO BE CLOSED TO PREVENT LOSS OF ALL REACTANT.
TANK 1 RELIEF VALVE AND MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE WOULDHAVE TO
FAIL OPEN TO LOSE ALL REACTANT. CLOSING LV021 WOULD STILL
SHUTDOWN FUEL CELLS 1 AND 3.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-94
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/2R
293 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV011
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4110
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
2/IR FOR TAL BECAUSE IF TANK 1 RELIEF VALVE FAILS OPEN, COULD
LOSE FUEL CELL 1 AND OMS PURGE CAPABILITY. 2/IR FOR RTLS BECAUSE
HELIUM PURGE CAPABILITY WOULD BE LOST. TANK 1 WOULD DEPLETE
FASTER SINCE IT ALONE COULD FEED FUEL CELL 1 AND ECLSS SYSTEM I.
FAILURE IS DETECTABLE FROM VALVE POSITION INDICATOR. 3/2R FOR
ASCENTS AND OTHER ABORTS IF TANK 1 HAS ITS CHECK VALVE OR FILTER
CLOSED, OR TANK RELIEF VALVE OPEN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-95
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: l/1
294 ABORT: l/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (1) LV011
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 1
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4110
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAK INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION AND FREEZE
OTHER SYSTEMS. IF ONLY LV011 LEAKS, CAN USE LV021 TO ISOLATE
LEAK, BUT MAY LOSE FUEL CELLS 1 AND 3. IF BOTH CROSSOVER VALVES
LEAK, MAY CAUSE ALL FUEL CELLS TO BE SHUTDOWN. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-96
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
295 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (I) LV021
FAILS OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4110
B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LV021 IS USED TO ISOLATE 02 FLOW FROM TANK 2 AND VALVE MODULE 2
(FUEL CELL 2 AND ECLSS SYSTEM 2) FROM THE OTHER FUEL CELLS AND
TANKS. IF THERE IS A LOW PRESSURE PROBLEM IN VALVE MODULE 2,
LV011 WOULD HAVE TO BE CLOSED TO PREVENT LOSS OF ALL REACTANT.
TANK 2 RELIEF VALVE AND MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE WOULD HAVE TO
FAIL OPEN TO LOSE ALL REACTANT. CLOSING LV011 WOULD STILL
SHUTDOWN FUEL CELLS 2 AND 3.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-97
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/2R
296 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (I) LV021
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: Mo HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
5)
6)
V)
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4110
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CRITICALITY IS 3/2R IF TANK 2 RELIEF VALVE FAILS OPEN OR
CHECK VALVE FAILS CLOSED. TANK 2 WOULD DEPLETE FASTER SINCE IT
ALONE COULD FEED FUEL CELL 2 AND ECLSS SYSTEM 2. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE FROM VALVE POSITION INDICATOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-98
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 1/l
297 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (1) LV021
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: l/1 RTLS: l/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: l/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: l/1
DEORBIT: l/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4110
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAK INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION AND FREEZE
OTHER SYSTEMS. IF ONLY LV021 LEAKS, CAN USE LV011 TO ISOLATE
LEAK, BUT MAY LOSE FUEL CELLS 3 AND 2 AND ECLSS SYSTEM 2. IF
BOTH CROSSOVER VALVES LEAK, MAY CAUSE ALL FUEL CELLS TO BE
SHUT DOWN. FAILURE IS DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM
CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-99
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
298 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 HORIZONTAL DRAIN QD (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0010-0180
B [ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FATIGUE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HORIZONTAL DRAIN IS USED AFTER LANDING TO DRAIN REMAINING
REACTANT FROM PRSD. A CAP PROVIDES A LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY. IF QD
AND CAP BOTH LEAK, LOSS OF ALL REACTANT COULD OCCUR, POSSIBLY
CAUSING FUEL CELL AND ECLSS SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN. CANNOT DETECT
LOSS OF QD ALONE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-100
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
299 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 HORIZONTAL DRAIN QD (1)
INABILITY TO MATE/DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0010-0180
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE DRAIN QD IS NOT USED AT LAUNCH PAD. THERE IS NO EFFECT AFTER
LANDING BECAUSE THE MISSION HAS ALREADY ENDED AND CAN DRAIN 02
THROUGH FILL QD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-101
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
300 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 HORIZONTAL DRAIN CAP (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/1R
211R
2/1R
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC 276-0010-0160
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FATIGUE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CAP IS A LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY OVER QD. REACTANT CANNOT LEAK
OUT UNLESS QD ALSO LEAKS. IF BOTH CAP AND QD LEAK, COULD LOSE ALL
02. CANNOT DETECT LOSS OF CAP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-i02
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
301 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LV024
FAILURE MODE:
02 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i)
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4103
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LV024 IS USED TO CONTROL 02 FLOW INTO FUEL CELL 3. IF FUEL CELL
3 IS SHUT DOWN, VALVE WOULD NEED TO BE CLOSED OR COULD LOSE
VEHICLE. LV021 OR LV011 COULD BE USED TO ISOLATE FUEL CELL, BUT
COULD NOT STOP REACTANT FLOW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-I03
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
302 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LV024
FAILURE MODE:
02 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (I)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4103
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ASCENT AND ABORTS BECAUSE IF 2 FUEL
CELL REACTANT VALVES FAIL, THEN ORBITER IS LOST. THE EARLIEST AN
ORBITER CAN OPERATE ON ONLY 1 FUEL CELL IS AFTER MECO. CAN DETECT
FAILURE USING FUEL CELL FLOWMETER.
FAILURE ONORBIT CAUSES PRIORITY FLIGHT DECISION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/04/86 BTK C_I04
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: i/1
303 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
LV024
FAILURE MODE:
02 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (1)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: l/1 RTLS : l/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: l/1 AOA: l/1
DEORBIT: l/1 ATO: l/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0429-4103
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
02 LEAKING INTO AREA UNDER THE PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION
AND FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. A LEAK MAY PREVENT FUEL CELL FROM
RECEIVING ADEQUATE REACTANT. A FAILURE IS DETECTABLE OVER A
PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-105
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
304 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LV023
FAILURE MODE:
02 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i)
FAILS OPEN (INCLUDES INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2 ) PRS D
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429a4102
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LV023 IS USED TO CONTROL 02 FLOW INTO FUEL CELL 2. IF FUEL CELL
2 IS SHUT DOWN, VALVE WOULD NEED TO BE CLOSED OR COULD LOSE
VEHICLE. COULD USE LV021 OR LV011 TO ISOLATE FUEL CELL, BUT
COULD NOT STOP REACTANT FLOW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-i06
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
305 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
LV023
FAILURE MODE:
02 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4102
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS CRITICALITY 2/1R FOR ASCENT AND ABORTS BECAUSE IF 2 FUEL
CELL REACTANT VALVES FAIL, THEN ORBITER IS LOST. THE EARLIEST AN
ORBITER CAN OPERATE ON ONLY 1 FUEL CELL IS AFTER MECO. CAN
DETECT FAILURE USING FUEL CELL FLOWMETER.
FAILURE ONORBIT CAUSES PRIORITY FLIGHT DECISION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-107
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: i/1
306 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
LV023
FAILURE MODE:
02 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (i)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
5)
6)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0429-4102
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
02 LEAKING INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE EXPLOSION AND
FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. A LEAK MAY PREVENT FUEL CELL FROM
RECEIVING ADEQUATE REACTANT. A FAILURE IS DETECTABLE OVER A
PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C=I08
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
307 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (1) RV011
FAILED OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
02 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
2/IR TAL: 2/1R
2/1R AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0440-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RVOll BY ITSELF AND COMBINED WITH LOSS OF RV021 WOULD
HAVE NO EFFECT. IF TANK 1 RELIEF VALVE ALSO FAILED OPEN COULD
LOSE ALL REACTANT, THUS 2/1R. NEED FAILURE UPSTREAM ALSO TO
DETECT WITH MANIFOLD 1 PRESSURE SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-I09
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i 0/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 308 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV011
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
02 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0440-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A PRESSURE BUILDUP AND POSSIBLE LINE RUPTURE COULD RESULT IF BOTH
RV011 AND RV021 WERE CLOSED. THE CAUSE OF AN EXCESSIVE PRESSURE
BUILDUP WOULD BE TANK HEATERS FAILED ON. IT IS CRITICALITY 3/1R
IF A TANK'S HEATERS FAIL ON AND ITS TANK RELIEF VALVE
FAILS CLOSED. THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM THE MANIFOLD PRESSURE
SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C=II0
!INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 309 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/1
i/I
ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (1) RV011
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
02 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: l/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: l/1
DEORBIT: l/1 ATO: l/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0440-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, FATIGUE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS CRITICALITY 1/1 BECAUSE A LEAK COULD CAUSE POSSIBLE
EXPLOSION OR FREEZING UNDER PAYLOAD BAY. A LEAK IS DETECTABLE
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-ill
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
310 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (1) RV021
FAILED OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
21ZR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
02 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3 / 3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284_0440-0003
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RV021 BY ITSELF OR COMBINED WITH RV011 WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT. IF TANK 2 RELIEF VALVE ALSO FAILED OPEN, COULD LOSE ALL
REACTANT, THUS 2/1R. NEED FAILURE UPSTREAM TO DETECT WITH
MANIFOLD 2 PRESSURE SENSOR.
THE FUNCTION OF THE VALVE IS PRESSURE CONTROL OF THE MANIFOLD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-I12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 311 ABORT:
ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (1) RV021
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
02 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORB_T: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0440-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A PRESSURE BUILDUP AND POSSIBLE LINE RUPTURE COULD RESULT IF BOTH
RV011 AND RV021 WERE CLOSED. THIS FAILURE IS DETECTABLE FROM THE
MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR. THE CRITICALITY IS 3/IR IF A TANK'S
HEATERS FAIL ON AND ITS TANK RELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-ll3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
312 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (I) RV021
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
02 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/I TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0440-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, FATIGUE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LEAK COULD CAUSE POSSIBLE EXPLOSION OR FREEZING UNDER PAYLOAD
BAY. A LEAK IS DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE
QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C=i14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
313 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 CHECK VALVE (2) CV021
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL LEAKAGE ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
02 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0428-0010
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CV021 CHECKS FLOW INTO TANK 3 AND THE OTHER CHECK VALVE CHECKS
FLOW INTO TANKS 4 AND 5. HIGHER PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM OF CHECK
VALVE THAN UPSTREAM WOULD FORCE REACTANT INTO TANK. LOW PRESSURE
IN TANK OR LEAK WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR IN ADDITION TO CHECK
VALVE FAILURE. RESULT COULD BE LOWER CYRO FLOW TO FUEL CELLS AND
POSSIBLE SHUTDOWN. FAILS SCEEN B BECAUSE NEED A TANK LEAK OR
RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN TO DETECT. THIS IS 2/IR BECAUSE
COMBINED FAILURE OF TANK LEAK OR RELIEF VALVE STUCK OPEN COULD
DEPLETE ALL 02.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-i15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
314 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 CHECK VALVE (2) CV021
FAILS CLOSED (RESTRICTED FLOW ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
Z)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
S)
S)
EPG
PRSD
OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
02 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1 R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0428=0010
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT UNABLE TO LEAVE TANK-THIS DEPLETES H2 OUT THE RELIEF
VALVE AND COULD CAUSE FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN. FAILURE OF RELIEF
VALVE ALSO COULD CAUSE TANK EXPLOSION, IF THE HEATER IS ON IN
MANUAL MODE OR FAILED ON.
THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM TANK PRESSURE SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-ll6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
315 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 CHECK VALVE (2) CV021
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
02 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0428-0010
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT LEAK INTO AREA UNDER THE PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE
EXPLOSION OR FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. MAY RESULT IN LOW OR NO 02
FLOW INTO FUEL CELLS. THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM TANK QUANTITY
SENSORS AND CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-I17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
316 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 LINES, COMPONENTS, & FITTINGS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-454898
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, FATIGUE, OVERPRESSURE, BRITTLENESS DUE
TO TEMPERATURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS CRITICALITY i/i BECAUSE ALL REACTANT COULD DEPLETE AND
CAUSE FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN; ALSO LEAK COULD CAUSE 02 TO FREEZE
OTHER SYSTEMS UNDER THE PAYLOAD BAY AND ALSO CAUSE EXPLOSION.
THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM TANK QUANTITY SENSORS AND CONSOLE
QUANTITY SENSORS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-I18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 317 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
i/i
ITEM: 02 LINES, COMPONENTS, & FITTINGS
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
V070-454898
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW COULD CAUSE NO REACTANT TO REACH FUEL CELL, AND
THUS CAUSE THEM TO BE SHUTDOWN. THIS IS i/i FOR TAL IF BLOCKAGE
AFFECTS FUEL CELL 1 BECAUSE IT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF OMS PURGE
CAPABILITY. ALSO i/I FOR RTLS BECAUSE SAME BLOCKAGE WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE CAPABILITY. FAILURE ONORBIT CAUSES
PRIORITY FLIGHT DECISION. OVERPRESSURE COULD BE VENTED OUT TANK
OR MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVES. THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM TANK PRESSURE
SENSORS OR FUEL CELL FLOW METERS. 2/IR FOR ASCENT AND OTHER
ABORTS BECAUSE BLOCKAGE TO 2 FUEL CELLS WOULD LOSE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-ll9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 318 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45QII(-5)05A
FULL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 1
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
F4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUB-ASSEMBLY L_
6)
[.
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063-0100
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSOR FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON HEATER OPERATION. SENSOR FAILURE
CANNOT BE VERIFIED BY LOOKING AT OTHER INSTRUMENTATION. CREW
WOULD ONLY KNOW THAT TANK CANNOT ALWAYS BE FULL. CREW MIGHT BE
ABLE TO FIGURE OUT APPROXIMATE QUANTITY BY TURNING HEATERS ON
FOR A CERTAIN TIME AND MEASURE CORRESPONDING FLUID TEMPERATURE OR
PRESSURE RISE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-120
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 319 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45QII(-5)05A
ZERO OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2 ) PRS D
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUB-ASSEMBLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD HAVE NO AUTOMATIC EFFECT ON HEATERS.
OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE CREW TO WANT TO TURN HEATERS OFF.
ZERO
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-121
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
320 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK QUANTITY SENSOR (5) V45Qll(-5) 05A
OUT OF TOLERANCE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUB-ASSEMBLY
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063_0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INACCURATE READING MAY CAUSE THE CREW TO CHANGE TANK
MANAGEMENT SCHEME. CREW COULD OPERATE TANK MISTAKENLY BELOW ITS
REDLINE LIMIT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-122
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
321 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5)01A
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSORS (5) V45TII(-
FULL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUB-ASSEMBLY
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SENSOR HAS NO EFFECT ON HEATER OPERATION. FAILURE CAN
BE DETECTED BY CHECKING HEATER ASSEMBLY TEMPERATURE SENSOR OR
TANK PRESSURE SENSOR. FULL OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE CREW TO WANT TO
TURN OFF HEATERS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
322 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5) 01A
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSORS (5) V45TII(-
ZERO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUB-ASSEMBLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE CREW TO WANT TO TURN HEATERS ON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-!24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
323 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5) 01A
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE SENSORS (5) V45TII(-
OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUB-ASSEMBLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INACCURATE READING MAY CAUSE CREW TO WANT TO MANUALLY OPERATE
HEATERS TO KEEP TEMPERATURE READING WITHIN TOLERANCES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-125
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
324 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
V45Tll (-5) 07A
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 1 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
FULL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUB-ASSEMBLY
6)
V)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063-0100
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATER ASSEMBLY 1 CONSISTS OF HEATERS A1 AND B1 IN EACH 02 TANK.
IF 5 TANKS FLY, THE B HEATERS IN TANKS 4 AND 5 WILL NOT BE
OPERATIONAL. THE SENSOR IS ONLY CONNECTED TO A GAUGE; IT DOES
NOT AFFECT HEATER OPERATION. FULL OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE CREW TO WANT
TO TURN HEATERS OFF° FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED BY CHECKING TANK
FLUID TEMPERATURE OR PRESSURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-126
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
325 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
V45TII (-5) 07A
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 1 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
ZERO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUB-ASSEMBLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE CREW TO WANT TO TURN HEATERS ON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
_BITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
':i0/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
PG FLIGHT: 3/3
26 ABORT: 3/3
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 1 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
l
_j
OUT OF TOLERANCE
S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
RARCHY:
FORAGE
_:_UB-AS S EM BLY
:
I
CRITICALITIES
_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
_: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
_._ 3/3 AOA: 3/3
_: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_/SAFING: 3/3
.l
:_EENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
MID FUSELAGE
,:MC282-0063-0100
_:ITION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
'YALE:
'_DING MAY CAUSE CREW TO WANT TO MANUALLY OPERATE
_P TEMPERATURE READING WITHIN TOLERANCES.
)./o3/86 C=128
!•
i,
i/
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
327 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
V45TII (-5) 09A
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 2 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
FULL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATER ASSEMBLY 2 CONSISTS OF HEATERS A2 AND B2 IN EACH 02 TANK.
IF 5 TANKS FLY, THE B HEATERS IN TANKS 4 AND 5 WILL NOT BE
OPERATIONAL. THE SENSOR IS ONLY CONNECTED TO A GAUGE; IT DOES
NOT AFFECT HEATER OPERATION.
FULL OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE CREW TO WANT TO TURN THE HEATERS OFF.
FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED BY CHECKING TANK FLUID TEMPERATURE OR
PRESSURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
328 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
V45Tll (-5) 09A
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 2 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
ZERO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE CREW TO WANT TO TURN HEATERS ON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-130
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
329 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
V45TII(-5)09A
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK HEATER ASSEMBLY 2 TEMPERATURE SENSOR (5)
OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
V)
8)
S)
SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INACCURATE READING MAY CAUSE CREW TO WANT TO MANUALLY OPERATE
HEATERS TO KEEP TEMPERATURE READING WITHIN TOLERANCES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 330 ABORT: 1/l
ITEM: 02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (5)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1 ) EPG _
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE ili
4) 02 TANKS
5) I
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063-0100
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, TEMPERATURE, POROSITY,
OVERPRESSURIZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAK IN TANK COULD CAUSE 02 TO FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS UNDER PAYLOAD
BAY AND ALSO CAUSE EXPLOSION. 02 COULD BE DEPLETED. THIS IS
DETECTABLE THROUGH QUANTITY SENSORS AND CONSOLE CHARTS OVER A
PERIOD OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-132
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
331 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (5)
RUPTURE
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) O2 TANKS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORB IT: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0100
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
i/1
I/1
C [NA ]
CAUSES: OVERPRESSURIZATION, TEMPERATURE, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RUPTURE COULD CAUSE DEPLETION OF 02 AND POSSIBLY OTHER
EXPLOSIONS. SHRAPNEL MAY PUNCTURE OTHER SYSTEMS, OR EXTERIOR OF
ORBITER. THIS IS DETECTABLE THROUGH QUANTITY AND PRESSURE
SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-133
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
332 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (5)
LOSS OF ANNULUS VACUUM
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0100
CAUSES: HOLE IN OUTER TANK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDUCTIVE AND CONVECTIVE HEAT TRANSFER COULD OCCUR WITHOUT A
VACUUM, CAUSING THE REACTANT TO HEAT UP AND BE DEPLETED QUICKLY.
FAILURE COULD BE CAUSED BY VACUUM IONIZATION PUMP AND VACUUM ION
PUMP PRESSURE SENSOR ON GROUND. THIS IS DETECTABLE FROM
TANK QUANTITY SENSOR AND CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS OVER PERIOD OF
TIME.
iS
!,
i
F
i:
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REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-134
!•
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
333 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 RELIEF PORT (i)
RESTRICTED FLOW
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: ° 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
40V45VP015
CAUSES: BLOCKAGE, CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS ONLY ONE 02 RELIEF PORT FOR FIVE 02 TANKS. IF BLOCKED,
COULD NOT RELIEVE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND TANKS WOULD RUPTURE.
THE CRITICALITY IS 3/IR IF SAME TANK'S HEATERS FAIL ON AND CHECK
VALVE FAILS CLOSED. THIS CAN BE DETECTED BY LOOKING AT
TANK PRESSURE GAUGES OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-135
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 2/IR
334 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK RELIEF VALVE (5) RV010,RV020,RV410,RV460
FAILED OPEN (ALSO INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG !il
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
6)
v)
8 ) _i
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0440-0401
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH TANK RELIEF VALVE RELIEVES EXCESS PRESSURE BUILDUP IN THE
TANKS ABOVE 1005 PSIG. IF VALVE IS FAILED OPEN, EARLY DEPLETION
OF 02 CAN RESULT. THE CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE IF SAME TANKS
CHECK VALVE IS ALSO FAILED OPEN, COULD LOSE ALL 02.
DETECTABLE FROM TANK QUANTITY AND PRESSURE SENSORS AND OVER A
PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.'
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-136
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
335 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK RELIEF VALVE (5) RV010,RV020,RV410,RV460
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANF S
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0440-0401
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF TANK IF PRESSURE CANNOT BE RELIEVED. THIS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF REACTANT AND ORBITER. THE CRITICALITY IS
3/IR IF SAME TANKS HEATERS FAIL ON AND CHECK VALVE FAILS CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-137
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: i/I
336 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK RELIEF VALVE (5) RV010,RV020,RV410,RV460
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: i;
i) EPG i
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE _
4) 02 TANKS !
6)
7)
8 ) i
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0440-0401
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EARLY DEPLETION OF 02 REACTANT, PLUS POSSIBLE EXPLOSION OR
FREEZING DUE TO REACTANT LEAKING UNDER THE PAYLOAD BAY. A LEAK
IS DETECTABLE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FROM CONSOLE QUANTITY CHARTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/04/86 BTK C-138
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 1/1
337 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
B2 (4 OR 3)
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK HEATER ELEMENT Al(5), A2(5), BI(4 OR 3),
FAILED ON
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
7)
S)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
i/I AOA: 3/IR
I/i ATO: 3/IR
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC282-0063-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE B HEATERS ARE NOT OPERATIONAL IN A 5 TANK CONFIGURATION, I.E.
3 SETS FOR 5 TANKS. EACH ELEMENT IS 250 WATTS. EACH TANK HAS 2
HEATER ASSEMBLIES, EACH WITH AN A AND B HEATER. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE FROM TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE SENSORS.
THIS IS CRITICALITY 3/IR BECAUSE RELIEF VALVES WOULD VENT
RESULTANT EXCESSIVE PRESSURE IN TANK AND DEPLETE THE 02. RELIEF
VALVE FLOW RATE AT FULL FLOW PRESSURE IS 164 LB/HR WHILE TANK
QUANTITY IS 781 LB. TANK COULD ALSO RUPTURE 35 HOURS AFTER TANK
RESIDUAL LEVEL IS REACHED, THUS i/i.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-139
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSlS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/IR
338 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
B2 (4 OR 3)
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK HEATER ELEMENT AI(5), A2(5), BI(4 OR 3),
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) O2 TANKS
5) 02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0063-0100
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN PRESSURE FALLS BELOW I00 PSI, TANK IS CONSIDERED LOST. THIS
WILL ALLOW COMPLETION OF ALL ABORTS AND ASCENTS SINCE EFFECT
WOULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL AFTER OMS-2. HOWEVER THE CRITICALITY IS
3/IR IF A COMBINATION OF TANK RELIEF VALVES AND MANIFOLD RELIEF
VALVES FAIL OPEN. THIS COULD BE DETECTED FROM TEMPERATURE,
QUANTITY, AND PRESSURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-140
T
iU.
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 339 ABORT:
ITEM: 02 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
FAILURE MODE: FULL OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC449-0185-001
B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FULL OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE HEATERS TO REMAIN OFF IN AUTOMATIC MODE.
PRESSURE WOULD HAVE TO DROP TO BELOW i00 PSI BEFORE TANK IS
CONSIDERED LOST, WHICH WOULD HAPPEN AFTER OMS2. CREW COULD CHECK
TANK PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE SENSORS TO SOLVE PROBLEM. THIS
IS CRITICALITY 3/1R AT LIFTOFF BECAUSE TANK RELIEF VALVES STUCK
OPEN COULD CAUSE LOSS OF PRESSURE EARLY. DETECTABLE FROM TANK
PRESSURE SENSOR.
\
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 340 ABORT:
ITEM: 02 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
FAILURE MODE: ZERO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
HDW/FUNC
1/1 If
3/1R
i) EPG _
2) PRS D
3) OXYGEN STORAGE I_
4) 02 TANKS _/
s)
6) i
7) I
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC449=0185-001
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE HEATERS TO BE ON ALWAYS IN AUTOMATIC MODE
AND RELIEF VALVE WOULD VENT 02 AND DEPLETE IT. RELIEF VALVE FLOW
RATE AT FULL FLOW PRESSURE IS 164 LB/HR WHILE TANK QUANTITY IS
781 LB.
ALSO TANK COULD RUPTURE STARTING 35 HOURS AFTER TANK RESIDUAL
LEVEL IS REACHED AND HEATERS STILL ON, THUS 1/1. THIS IS
DETECTABLE FROM TANK PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE SENSORS.
REFERENCES:
C-142REPORT DATE 12/03/86
i
6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 341 ABORT:
ITEM: 02 TANK HEATER CONTROLLER PRESSURE
SENSOR/TRANSDUCER (4)
FAILURE MODE: OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
HDW/FUNC
1/1
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: I/1 AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC449-0185-001
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPENDS ON DEGREE OF BEING OUT OF TOLERANCE - WORST CASE IS UNION
OF ZERO AND FULL OUTPUT. COULD CAUSE HEATERS TO OPERATE
ERRATICALLY. DETECTABLE FROM TANK PRESSURE SENSOR.
A TANK COULD RUPTURE STARTING 35 HOURS AFTER THE TANK RESIDUAL
LEVEL IS REACHED AND ITS HEATERS ARE STILL ON, THUS i/I.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-143
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC !
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3 I_
MDAC ID: 342 ABORT: 3/3
02 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR (5)
FULL OUTPUT
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTTLEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: _
l) EPG !
2) PRS D _i
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS _
5 ) i_-
6)
7) _
8 ) _,
9) i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC449-0105-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE PRESSURE SENSORS HAVE NO EFFECT ON OTHER COMPONENTS, THEY
ONLY DRIVE GAUGES. FULL OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE CREW TO TURN OFF
HEATERS. CREW WOULD CHECK RELIEF VALVE CRACK PRESSURE, AND
QUANTITY AND TEMPERATURE SENSORS TO SEE IF
PRESSURE READING WAS ACCURATE.
I,
REFERENCES: i
[:
ill
[_
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-144 i?
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
343 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR (5)
ZERO OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC449-0105-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ZERO OUTPUT WOULD CAUSE CREW TO TURN HEATERS ON. CREW WOULD
CHECK TANK TEMPERATURE AND QUANTITY SENSORS TO SEE IF PRESSURE
READING WAS ACCURATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC _
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3 _
MDAC ID: 344 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: 02 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR (5) !i
FAILURE MODE: OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG !
2) PRS D (
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) o2 TANKS li
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC449-0105-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INACCURATE READING MAY CAUSE CREW TO WANT TO MANUALLY OPERATE
HEATERS TO KEEP PRESSURE READING WITHIN TOLERANCE. CREW COULD
USE TEMPERATURE AND QUANTITY SENSORS TO SEE IF PRESSURE READING
IS ACCURATE. A SMALL ERROR WILL NOT CAUSE ANY PROBLEMS.
REFERENCES:
/,
L
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-146
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
345 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL AND VENT QD CAPS (9)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRS D
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0160
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, WEARS OUT, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH TANK HAS ITS OWN VENT QD CAP AND FILL QD CAP, EXCEPT TANKS 4
AND 5 WHICH SHARE A FILL QD CAP. THE QD'S THEMSELVES ARE A LEVEL
OF REDUNDANCY TO STOP LEAKS. BOTH CAP AND QD HAVE TO LEAK FOR A
TANK LEAK TO OCCUR.
FAILURE OF CAP ALONE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-147
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86
EPG
346
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/ZR
ITEM:
VENT QD'S (5)
FAILURE MODE:
02 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL QUICK DISCONNECTS (4) AND
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: I
I) EPG _
2) PRS D
3) OXYGEN STORAGE _
4) 02 TANKS i_
5)
6 ) _:_
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0010-0110
B [F] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, WEARS OUT, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH TANK HAS ITS OWN FILL AND VENT QD'S, EXCEPT TANKS 4 AND 5
SHARE 1 FILL QD. ALL QD'S ARE ALSO CAPPED FOR ADDITIONAL
REDUNDANCY. BOTH CAP AND QD HAVE TO LEAK FOR A TANK LEAK TO
OCCUR.
ALSO FAILURE OF TANK CHECK VALVE OPEN OR MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE
FAILED OPEN COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL REACTANT. FAILURE OF QD
ALONE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
REFERENCES:
C-148REPORT DATE 12/03/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
347 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
VENT QD'S (5)
FAILURE MODE:
02 (PRE-FLIGHT) FILL QUICK DISCONNECTS (4) AND
INABILITY TO MATE/DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN STORAGE
4) 02 TANKS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC276-0010-0110
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MISSION DELAYED IF CAN'T FILL TANKS OR RELEASE QD. ONLY
PRELAUNCH PHASE IS AFFECTED, THE FILL QD ALSO FUNCTIONS AS A
VERTICAL DRAIN AT PAD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 348 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: 02 FUEL CELL REACTANT VALVE POSITION INDICATORS
(3) V45XIISOE, V45XlI55E, V45XII60E
FAILURE MODE: READS OPEN WHEN VALVE CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULES
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSOR IS USED TO TELL CREW OF VALVE'S POSITION. NORMALLY, ALL
VALVES ARE OPEN. COULD VERIFY ACCURACY FROM FUEL CELL
FLOWMETERS.
REFERENCES:
y
!:
i
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-150
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 349 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: 02 FUEL CELL REACTANT VALVE POSITION INDICATORS
(3) V45XlISOE, V45XII55E, V45XII60E
FAILURE MODE: READS CLOSED WHEN VALVE OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULES
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD VERIFY ACCURACY FROM FUEL CELL FLOWMETERS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-151
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 350 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: H2 FUEL CELL REACTANT VALVE POSITION INDICATORS
(3) V45X2150E, V45X2155E, V45X2160E
FAILURE MODE: READS OPEN WHEN VALVE CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: SI
l) EPG _
2) PRSD
3) HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION !7
4) H2 VALVE MODULES i_
S)
6)
7 ) i
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSOR IS USED TO TELL CREW OF VALVE'S POSITION. NORMALLY, ALL
VALVES ARE OPEN. COULD VERIFY ACCURACY FROM FUEL CELL
FLOWMETERS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-152
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 351 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: H2 FUEL CELL REACTANT VALVE POSITION INDICATORS
(3) V45X2150E, V45X2155E, V45X2160E
FAILURE MODE: READS CLOSED WHEN VALVE OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD VERIFY ACCURACY FROM FUEL CELL FLOWMETERS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 352 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: 02 ECLSS SYSTEM SUPPLY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR
(2) V45XI080E, V45XI083E
FAILURE MODE: READS OPEN WHEN VALVE CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2 ) PRS D
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION Ii
4) 02 VALVE MODULES !
s)
6) !.
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSOR IS USED TO TELL CREW OF VALVE'S POSITION. NORMALLY, ALL
VALVES ARE OPEN. COULD VERIFY ACCURACY FROM FLOWMETERS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C_154
!.
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 353 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: 02 ECLSS SYSTEM SUPPLY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR
(2) V45XI080E, V45XI083E
FAILURE MODE: READS CLOSED WHEN VALVE OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULES
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD VERIFY ACCURACY FROM FLOWMETERS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-155
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 354
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD VALVE POSITION INDICATORS (2)
V45Xl141E, V45Xl146E
FAILURE MODE: READS OPEN WHEN VALVE CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULES
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSOR IS USED TO TELL CREW OF VALVE'S POSITION. NORMALLY, ALL
VALVES ARE OPEN. THE FAILURE CAN BE VERIFIED FROM FLOWMETER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-156
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 355 ABORT:
ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD VALVE POSITION INDICATORS (2)
V45Xl141E, V45Xll46E
FAILURE MODE: READS CLOSED WHEN VALVE OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULES
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSOR IS USED TO TELL CREW OF VALVE'S POSITION.
BE VERIFIED FROM FLOWMETER.
THE FAILURE CAN
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-157
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPG
MDAC ID: 356
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD VALVE POSITION INDICATORS (2)
V45X2141E, V45X2146E
FAILURE MODE: READS OPEN WHEN VALVE CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSOR IS USED TO TELL CREW OF VALVE'S POSITION. NORMALLY, ALL
VALVES ARE OPEN. THE FAILURE CAN BE VERIFIED FROM THE FLOWMETER.
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REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-158 i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPG FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 357 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD VALVE POSITION INDICATORS (2)
V45X2141E, V45X2146E
FAILURE MODE: READS CLOSED WHEN VALVE OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
!) EPG
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
PRSD
HYDROGEN DISTRIBUTION
H2 VALVE MODULES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CORROSION, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSOR IS USED TO TELL CREW OF VALVE'S POSITION.
BE VERIFIED FROM THE FLOWMETER.
THE FAILURE CAN
REFERENCES:
2PORT DATE 12/03/86 C-159
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
358 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 FILTER (5) FL010,FL020,FL410,FL460
RESTRICTED FLOW, CLOGGED
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
EPG
PRSD
02 DISTRIBUTION
02 RELIEF VALVE/FILTER PACKAGES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC286-0054-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS, DAMAGED ELEMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH H2 AND 02 CYRO TANK HAS A FILTER FOR ITS REACTANT POSITIONED
AHEAD OF ITS CHECK VALVE. THE FILTER IS REPLACED EVERY 15
FLIGHTS. IF FILTER CLOGS, REACTANTS ARE UNABLE TO GET TO FUEL
CELLS, AND REACTANT IS DEPLETED OUT TANK RELIEF VALVE.
THE FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED USING TANK PRESSURE SENSOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-160
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
359 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 CHECK VALVE (1) CV020
FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL LEAKAGE ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0428-0010
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CV020 CHECKS FLOW INTO TANK 2. HIGHER PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM OF
CHECK VALVE THAN UPSTREAM WOULD FORCE REACTANT INTO TANK LINE.
LOWER PRESSURE IN TANK OR LEAK WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR IN ADDITION TO
CHECK VALVE FAILURE. RESULT COULD BE LOWER CYRO FLOW TO FUEL
CELLS AND POSSIBLE SHUTDOWN. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE NEED A TANK
LEAK OR RELIEF VALVE FAILED OPEN TO NOTICE. THIS IS CRITICALITY
2/1R BECAUSE COMBINED FAILURE OF TANK RELIEF VALVE OPEN COULD
LOSE VEHICLE DUE TO REACTANT LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/s6
EPG
36O
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 CHECK VALVE (1) CV020
FAILS CLOSED (RESTRICTED FLOW ALSO)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
s)
6)
v)
s)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE
MC284-0428-0010
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION,
JAMMING, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT IS UNABLE TO LEAVE TANK. THIS DEPLETES H2 OUT THE
RELIEF VALVE AND COULD CAUSE FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN. THIS IS
DETECTABLE FROM TANK PRESSURE SENSOR. FAILURE OF RELIEF VALVE
CLOSED ALSO COULD CAUSE TANK EXPLOSION, IF HEATER IS ON IN MANUAL
MODE OR FAILED ON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-162
/
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPG FLIGHT:
361 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 CHECK VALVE (i) CV020
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH SUBSYS LEAD: M. HIOTT
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRSD
3) OXYGEN DISTRIBUTION
4) 02 VALVE MODULE 2
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: i/i
ONORBI T: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: l/1 ATO: l/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MID FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0428-0010
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, FATIGUE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTANT LEAKAGE INTO AREA UNDER PAYLOAD BAY COULD CAUSE
EXPLOSION OR FREEZE OTHER SYSTEMS. LEAK MAY RESULT IN LOW OR NO
CRYO FLOW INTO FUEL CELLS. FAILURE IS DETECTABLE FROM TANK
QUANTITY AND PRESSURE SENSORS AND MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSORS
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/03/86 C-163

MDAC ID
200
202
207
208
209
211
213
216
217
218
228
229
231
233
234 •
236.
237
239
240
242
243
245
246
248
254
255
256
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
H2 (pre-flight) fill and
vent QD's
H2 (pre-flight) fill and
vent QD caps
H2 tank heater controller
pressure sensor/transducer
H2 tank heater controller
pressure sensor/transducer
H2 tank heater elements A&B
H2 tank relief valve
H2 tank relief valve
H2 tank subassembly
H2 tank subassembly
H2 tank subassembly
H2 lines, components and ,
fittings
H2 lines, components and
fittings
H2manifold 1 relief valve
RV031
H2 manifold 1 relief valve
RV031
H2 manifold 2 relief valve
RV041
H2 manifold 2 relief valve
RV041
H2 check valves -.CV031,
CV041
H2 check valves - CV031,
CV041
H2 check valve - CV030
H2 check valve - CV030
H2 check valve - CV040
H2 check valve - CVO40
H2 horizontal drain QD
H2 horizontal drain cap
H2 manifold 1 solenoid
crossover valve - CV031
H2 fuel cell 1 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV033
H2 fuel cell 1 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV033
FAILURE MODE
External leakage
External leakage
Zero output
Out of tolerance
Fails on
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
External leakage
Rupture
Loss of annulus
vacuum
External leakage
Restricted flow
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
Fails open (.also
internal leakage)
External leakage.
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
External leakage
External leakage
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
Fails closed
D-I
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
266
267
269
270
272
274
275
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
289
290
291
294
297
H2 fuel cell 1 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV033
H2 fuel cell 2 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV043
H2 fuel cell 2 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV043
H2 fuel cell 2 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV043
H2 fuel cell 3 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV044
H2 fuel cell 3 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV044
H2 fuel cell 3 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV044
H2 manifold 2 solenoid
crossover valve - LV041
H2 solenoid GSE supply
valve - LV045
H2 solenoid GSE supply
valve - LV045
H2 fill GSE supply T-O QD -
PD035
02 check valve -,CV010
02 check valve - CV010
02 solenoid GSE.supply
valve - LV_I5
02 solenoid GSE supply
valve - LV015
02 solenoid ECLSS system i.
supply valve - LV012
02 solenoid. ECLSS system 1
supply valve - LV012
02 solenoid ECLSS system 1
supply valve - LV012
02 solenoid ECLSSsystem 2
supply valve - LV022
02 solenoid ECLSS system 2
supply valve - Lv022
02 solenoid ECLSS system 2
supply valve - LV022
02 fill GSE supply T-0
QD - PD015
02 fuel cell 1 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV013
02 fuel cell 1 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV013
02 fuel cell 1 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV013
02 manifold 1 solenoid
crossover valve - LV011
02 manifold 2 solenoid
crossover valve - LV021
D-2
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage
Fails closed
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage
Fails closed
External leakage
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
Fails closed
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal, leakage)
Fails closed
External leakage
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
Fails closed
External leakage
External leakage
External leakage
298
3OO
301
302
303
304
3O5
306
307
309
310
312
313
315
316
317
330
331 -
332
334
336
337
340
341
345
346
359
361
02 horizontal drain QD
02 horizontal drain cap
02 fuel cell 3 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV024
02 fuel cell 3 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV024
02 fuel cell 3 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV024
02 fuel cell 2 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV023
02 fuel cell 2 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV023
02 fuel cell 2 solenoid
reactant supply valve LV023
02 manifold 1 relief valve -
RV011
02 manifold i relief valve -
RV011
02 manifold 2 relief valve -
RV021
02 manifold.2 relief valve -
RV021
02 check valve - CV021
02 check valve - CV021
02 lines, components and
fittings
02 lines, components and
fittings •.
02 tank subassembly
02 ta_k subassembly
02 tank subassembly
t
02 tank relief valves
02 tank relief valves
02 tank heater elements
A1, A2, B1, B2
02 tank heater controller
pressure sensor/transducer
02 tank heater controller
pressure sensor/transducer
02 (pre-flight) fill and
vent QD caps
02 (pre-flight) fill and
vent QD.'s
02 check valve - CV020
02 check valve - CV020
External leakage
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
Fails closed
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
Fails closed
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
External leakage
Restricted flow
External leakage
RuPture
Loss of annulus
vacuum
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
Fails on
Zero output
Out of tolerance
External leakage
External leakage
Fails open (also
internal leakage)
External leakage
D-3

